Chemical Weapons and Arms Control

The entry into force of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention is unique in the history of arms control. This disarmament agreement both bans an entire class of weapons and simultaneously addresses chemical weapon proliferation concerns.

Chemical weapon disarmament has progressed far since the first attempts a century ago to outlaw the use of CW in war. As of 2007, only two states (the United States and Russia) are publicly known to be holders of CW stockpiles and these countries are systematically destroying their weapons under third party verification. Iraq was a major producer and user of chemical weapons, but Iraqi weapons were destroyed under the supervision of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) following the Gulf War.

However, the full magnitude of the threat from chemical weapons will only become clear when all states have joined the CWC and declared their stockpiles and past chemical warfare-related activities.

While many weapons depend on chemistry for their effect, the term ‘Chemical Weapons’ is reserved for toxic chemicals combined with munitions and devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those chemicals. A toxic chemical is any chemical that through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.

It is possible to compile a list of chemical agents that have been specifically designed or developed for use as weapons or that have actually been used in this way. However, this does not exclude the possible application of other chemicals (including perhaps some yet to be discovered) as weapons as weapons.

The CWC establishes how and when declared chemical weapon stockpiles should be destroyed. It has proved possible to establish destruction timetables for the two countries with by far the largest stockpiles (the United States and Russia) and, where necessary, adjust those timetables within the framework of the OPCW. In this way states can be confident that the failure to hold to a destruction timetable is not evidence of an unwillingness to comply with the CWC.