

Policing Europe: European Policing?
The challenge of coordination in international policing

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WORKSHOP REPORT
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SESSION I: COORDINATING POLICING ENDS AND MEANS

Policing Europe or independent European policing: the role of regional organizations in police operation—Dr. Renata Dwan, SIPRI, Stockholm

Dr. Dwan opened the workshop by setting out some of the main themes of the workshop. She pointed out that both regional organizations (ROs) and civilian police are relatively recent actors to peace operations. Their presence reflects post-Cold War changes in the international environment as well as the increasingly internal character of contemporary conflicts. Policing in peace operations represents a much more comprehensive degree of intervention in the domestic order of a sovereign state and, given the context-dependent nature of policing, is an extremely challenging task for external actors. It is even more difficult of multinational external actors that bring together diverse police cultures and styles.

The role of police in peace operations expanded considerably over the course of the 1990s from monitoring and observation to the current executive policing missions in Kosovo and East Timor. In between are complex reform and restructuring operations that may include elements of law enforcement, e.g., Bosnia, Cambodia and Haiti. The success of such tasks depends very much on the degree of unity and coordination between the actors involved. Regional organizations are perceived by many to have advantages over the United Nations (UN) in this regard: a capacity for speedier decision-making and action, an understanding of the regional culture, networks of contacts within the host state, diverse tools to engage in crisis management and greater political willingness to commit to longer term peace-building in the region. These strengths appear to support the development of regional policing capacity.

The record to date, however, shows a varying picture. Dr. Dwan identified four models of regional involvement in international policing: 1) regional succession, where the UN gradually hands over policing responsibility to a regional organization, as in Eastern Slavonia and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); 2) joint policing, where the regional organization cooperates with the UN in a UN operation, e.g., Organization of American States (OAS) in Haiti; 3) division of labour, where different actors divide law and order responsibilities between them, e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Kosovo Force (KFOR), OSCE and the UN in Kosovo; 4) UN-sanctioned regional policing, where the regional organization acts alone on the approval of the UN, e.g., Western European Union (WEU) in Albania. In most of these cases regional organizations have encountered the same problems as the UN in carrying out international policing—slow deployment

¹ While every effort has been made to faithfully represent the views expressed by the speakers, the authors retain sole responsibility for the contents of this report.

record, skill and resource constraints, lack of logistical and technical equipment, poor planning and weak ability to sustain a policing programmes over the long term. It is an open question whether current European Union (EU) and OSCE efforts to develop regional policing capacity will overcome and help mitigate existing weaknesses in international policing or whether regional organizations will reproduce on a smaller scale the cumbersome UN model.

The legitimacy of regional engagement in international policing is an overarching concern. The UN is the global authority in peace operations and legitimate regional policing requires UN sanction. Further, mechanisms of oversight and control must be established to ensure regional organizations act in an impartial manner and carry out policing tasks in a manner consistent with UN principles and guidelines. Such controls are not only difficult to enact but encroach on the independence and autonomy that many regional organizations zealously guard. How free are regional organizations to shape the type of police reform enacted in a host state? Finally, how will regional policing be financed? The relative wealth of the EU stands in stark contrast to many other regional organizations which lack the financial and institutional capacity to undertake policing tasks without the support of other external actors. These are all questions that must be addressed before specific regional policing capacities are elaborated.

Policymaking and practical coordination between the UN and regional organizations—Michael Jorsback, UN CivPol Unit, New York

Michael Jorsback noted that the previously competitive relationship between regional organizations and the UN had been replaced in recent times by a more cooperative spirit. There was an opportunity to learn from past mistakes. The recent Brahimi Report, while containing nothing new, came at a good time, and might contain lessons for ROs also.

Regional action resulted from, and in turn reinforced, ‘regional ownership’ of a crisis. The UN recognizes the importance of this and believes that regional succession should always part of a peace agenda—particularly for expert long-term institution building and development. Both the UN and ROs have distinct advantages in peace operations. The UN has a wealth of experience, and it also represents the ‘entire’ international community, which gives it unparalleled legitimacy as an actor—although it is not the best at everything. The question then is how to link and coordinate the UN and ROs. In classical monitoring and training operations this is not so important as long as the operation is UN-sanctioned because the host nation has given its consent. However, in enforcement operations the legal aspects and practical capabilities of RO policing is much more sensitive and cooperation between the UN and the RO is vital.

Turning to European developments, Jorsback reminded participants that the same resources were involved in UN and in regional police operations and that the membership of each overlapped. He also argued that it was not automatically the case that European police officers were superior to others in peace operations. There was a tendency in Europe to blame poorer countries but in fact many European countries also failed to train police for peace operations.

The time to coordinate with ROs was at the planning-stage, because a lot of planning was going on in different organizations. Enhanced preparedness within the EU represented the greatest potential advantage of EU policing capacity for the UN.

Policymaking and practical coordination between the UN and regional organizations
—Michael Matthiessen, European Council Policy Unit, Brussels

Michael Matthiessen stressed the speed with which EU policing for crisis management has developed in the past 18 months. Policing was second only to the military aspects of intervention in priority, and mechanisms were created to reflect this. Under the Portuguese presidency a database was set up which highlighted that over 3300 police from EU member states were already deployed in various peace operations in 2000. A headline goal was then set for 5000 to be available by 2003, and indications are that this will be achieved. The Portuguese presidency also focused on developing the Civil Crisis Committee which the Council created. The French presidency established a planning role for the presidency, and the Swedish presidency has created new working groups which meet regularly. The Swedish presidency has also stressed cooperation with international organizations (IOs) and cooperation with third party-states (non-EU members). The first meeting of EU police chiefs will take place on 10 May, and while this will not lead to new commitments it will generate further discussion of policing. The forthcoming Belgian presidency will hold a pledging conference of commitments to building a police capacity.

Furthermore, Secretary-General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana has expressed his interest in police issues. Within the Council's Policy Planning Unit a database has been created to list personnel and equipment available for deployment. A special unit of 6–7 experts to coordinate police matters has recently been created within the Council secretariat, and a police expert will be assigned to the Military Staff. Soon, all crisis management staff will be co-located in a single building. The Commission has also created structures, including a Crisis Management Unit which will have responsibility for police training and technical assistance as exemplified by its future management of Multinational Advisory Police Element for Albania (MAPE).

High level contacts have been made between the EU and the UN. The European Council and the UN Secretariat were in contact, and areas to be coordinated included lessons learned, training, standards and integration of the rule of law aspects. The question of how to develop an EU contribution to the UN was being discussed, with the aim of ensuring that the EU 'added value' to UN operations. The EU was also preparing for EU-led missions, preferably with a UN mandate. While little practical coordination has so far occurred, the mechanisms for the future are now in place.

Comment: Halvor Hartz, Norwegian Police, Oslo

Halvor Hartz noted that the UN has a global responsibility and must deal with the conflicts that no one else is able or willing to touch. ROs, however, vary in their capacity to deal with conflict situations from region to region, and from organization

to organization within a region. Also, ROs may have greater flexibility to be involved in policing operations than peacekeeping.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was limited to peace operations authorized by the UN Security Council, and consequently UN Civilian Police (CivPol) cannot get involved in other programmes. Policing personnel in ROs were usually 'recycled' UN personnel and therefore have experience of UN standards and procedures. The fact that ROs address policing does not automatically create new personnel unless specific steps are also taken.

He then drew a comparison between missions. In Kosovo there was a political will on the part of Europe to engage in policing. The UN subcontracted to NATO, OSCE and EU and the different roles were clearly defined, which reduced inter-organizational conflict. In East Timor no RO was prepared to act, and thus the UN ran everything. Therefore the resources available were far smaller. In Sierra Leone almost no one was interested and resources were almost non-existent. ROs might be able to induce members to free up resources because smaller membership puts greater pressure on individual states. However, the interest generated in ROs should not allow states to abandon their interest in issues outside their region.

Discussion:

In discussion it was suggested that coordination within the EU might be harder than between the EU and other organizations, although the changing structures and dynamics of EU crisis management are to be welcomed. The question was raised whether the EU has considered either 'out of area' operations and/or activity without a UN mandate: the EU is not geographically constrained in where it might operate, but restricted only by political decision-making. Others noted that some states might not accept an EU involvement in non-European conflicts but would insist that the members contribute under a UN flag. It was unlikely that the EU would become involved without either a UN mandate or invitation from the parties to a conflict.

Policing presents problems for coordination within states too. Requests for assistance usually come to foreign ministries, but it is interior or justice ministries that control police—sometimes control is split between ministries. However, ministerial divides should be overcome. Member-states were changing rules and laws in response to EU inquiries which exposed low availability of personnel. Countries close to EU candidacy were giving figures for their availability before some EU members managed.

It was observed that the division of labour between the UN and ROs in Kosovo was ad hoc, and strategic thinking was required to identify the strengths and weaknesses of particular organizations. It was also noted that ROs usually lack the ability to run a peace operation themselves and it would be better if ROs recognized their strengths – for example, the OSCE in capacity building. Peace operations might be left to the UN, while ROs could step in for the longer-term capacity building. It was noted that this was the reverse of the traditional logic, which saw regionally-organized troops (NATO, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) act as peace enforcers, and the UN follow up as the peacekeeper and builder.

To create more police, states must factor international deployment into planning and budgeting for domestic policing. Although numbers of police were important, so too was specialization. Thus rather than thousands of beat-officers, what might be needed is smaller numbers of experts in, for example, white-collar crime, gender crime, or border crime. Particular states have skills and specialities which should be exploited. However, it was noted that the creation of 1700 more internationally-deployable police among EU states was a success. While figures were not everything, they were important, catching the public's attention and establishing visible targets that motivate states to respond.

Outside Europe some see these activities as potentially drawing resources away from the Third World, and thus the question was raised how funding is to be drawn back to the South. As the number of actors increases, the same resources are simply spread more thinly.

Session II: Coordination in CivPol training

Opening Remarks—Joel Brorsson, Justice Ministry, Sweden

Brorsson reinforced the point that the EU's policing project is in part a political project. While there has been a long history of coordination among EU member states on police matters, it has always been a sensitive area and challenges of accommodating to different cultures remain. Joint training for police officers was an essential first step towards building commonality. Joint training would harmonize policing standards. The EU Police Cooperation Working Group has made progress on the criteria of selection for police officers. In December 2000 the European Council established a European police college, which will provide courses in international policing operations for officers. These developments are tangible proof that the EU is moving from the drawing board to the more operational part of coordination in international policing.

Options for CivPol training in Europe—Arto Rajala, Permanent Representative of Finland to the EU

Arto Rajala presented the Finnish model of basic police training for policing operations. Finland has followed the UN's regulations and standards for policing and in some cases set its own, more demanding standards. He suggested that the EU should follow the UN's standards to encourage complementarity.

Civilian police training is a relatively new aspect for the Finnish police, having only begun training courses in 1994. Rajala listed some of the requirements for entry into CivPol courses. They include passing a mental/psychological test, the ability to speak English, a minimum age of 30 years, eight of which include service in the police, and experience of UN CivPol missions. Verification and testing is carried out by independent, private firms.

It is a testament to the rigour of the training that of the 170 men sent on overseas missions, only 1 has been repatriated. The programme pays particular attention to specialized skills that candidates may need. The training course covers first aid, human rights, an introduction to various organizations (e.g., UN, OSCE, EU, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, non-governmental organizations), mission briefings (although this is covered in greater detail at the onset of a particular mission) and civil-military relations. In light of the Finnish experience, the need to have regional training centres outside of national countries was questionable. He was particularly concerned with the financial costs associated with it.

Training for specialized functions—Lt. Col. François-Xavier Bourges, Defence Ministry, France

There is a wide variety of possible missions, from conflict prevention through crisis management to post-conflict reconstruction, in areas of low or high intensity conflict. European police are ideal for these tasks due to their competence, the respect for the rule of law, and their diversity. The EU must therefore identify the correct forces for the task. However, deploying CivPol is not an end in itself, but must be seen within a wider perspective of restoring the rule of law in the target country. The EU is ideally placed to assist here, as it has a wide range of instruments at its disposal. The means of member states and the Commission must be used in synergy, and an exit strategy must be devised. In complex emergencies, they will need to work closely with the military, perhaps under military command in the early stages of the mission.

Training is essential to overcome diversity between member states' forces so that they become accustomed to working together and with the armed forces. Prior planning and identification of resources is also vital. Member states, particularly the Scandinavians, have already learnt lessons from previous deployment. Furthermore France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal's para-military police have cooperated in integrated deployments.

Two types of training are required: training of EU integrated police units; and training of high-level managers. Common tactical exercises of these integrated police units should be held, based on scenarios drawn from complex peace operations like that in Kosovo. Situations relating to the maintenance of law and order could include area control, relief of threatened units, crowd control, escorting of convoys and response when under fire. With regards to supporting criminal investigations training could cover security at the scene of the crime, protecting investigators, making arrests, pedestrian and traffic control. Technical training could include mastery of a person, search of premises, protection and evacuation of wounded personal, first aid, and how to react following the discovery of ammunition, explosives or traps.

Managers should be trained to address the political and diplomatic framework of the deployment, the planning of a police operation, the legal framework of intervention, financial management, civil-police relations, military-police relations and media relations. It is also essential to coordinate with other organizations such as the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe, as well as with non-member states which may wish to work alongside an EU force.

Comment—Barrie Meyers, REACT Unit, OSCE Secretariat, Vienna, and Robert Perito, ICITAP, Justice Department, Washington

Meyers felt that there is no real need to train everybody in every skill and was in favour of the comparative advantage concept. It was more important to coordinate different efforts and to maintain consistency. He suggested that bilateral training and collegial networking be looked at as possible avenues of cooperation. Although the role of civilian police has changed, the public is not necessarily aware of this change. Therefore, there is a need to educate the public accordingly. There is also a need for increased dialogue between the military and the police. Finally, there is an urgent need to change the attitude of some contributing states that conducting pre-mission training is not necessary.

Perito presented the US perspective on policing. He explained that in the USA, participation in international operations was not seen as prestigious but as a drain on scarce police resources. In many cases it also hampered career advancement. There are 18 000 police forces in the United States but no singular, national force. The State Department runs the international police department but outsources recruitment to Dyncorp, an independent firm which in turn hires individual police officers. There is no training involved. According to Perito, the Bush Administration wants to decrease military involvement in peace operations and increase civilian participation. The State Department is also in the process of creating a database of 2000 names and is modelling its standards to that of Canada's.

Discussion:

The question of appropriate target groups of training courses was of particular concern. While most participants agreed that it would be more effective if middle-level officers were targeted instead of high-level officers, others cautioned that high-level officers should not be neglected. The sufficiency of just following UN guidelines in police training without having some sort of exchange between different heads of police colleges was questioned. Formal channels of coordination and exchange are required. There was a comment that the EU is perhaps better suited for police/judiciary legislation reform rather than actual policing itself. On NATO's involvement in policing, some pointed out that NATO was beginning to give attention to the issue of policing and the need for coordination with police actors. On deployment, there was a general consensus that missions of mixed civilian and military personnel should be encouraged. All in all, the participants agreed that training prior to sending personnel to missions, particularly joint training, was crucial.

SESSION III: COORDINATION IN LOCAL POLICE EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Coordination in local police education and training—Steve Bennett, Kosovo Police School, Pristina

Bennett presented an overview of the progress made thus far in the establishment and training of a local police force in Kosovo. The Kosovo Police School (KPS) was established in order to build a multi-ethnic police force based on democratic principles, which would be trained to international standards. Under a partnership mandate, the UN and the OSCE are key actors in the programme. The UN is responsible for operational development and deployment while the OSCE is responsible for standards and career education. The biggest challenge encountered so far is to create a credible and trustworthy police force that the Kosovar people can respect and trust.

Of the targeted 6000 police officers, 5800 have already been trained. However, this figure does not include border patrol, court security or corrections—1200 police managers and supervisors are also in training. There are 32 departments, but these have not been totally constituted yet. KPS officers outnumber UN CivPol in four of the five brigade-areas.

Enrolment into the KPS school is not easy. Candidates must be at least 21 years old, a resident of Kosovo, physically and mentally fit, with a secondary education and no criminal record. If a candidate meets these criteria then he or she will go through a screening process including an oral interview, written examination, psychological test, medical examination, physical agility test and a background investigation. It is a testimony to the rigour of this procedure that 80 per cent of candidates fail the screening process. The programme has successfully incorporated minorities and women into the force—17 per cent of the force consists of minorities and 20 per cent are women, but former KLA soldiers represent a large proportion (c. 40 per cent) of the force. Women candidates are recruited, trained and deployed to the same standards as the men. Although the ethnic minority (mainly Serbs) in the force are able to display professionalism and integrity, the general public still has a difficult time accepting Serb police officers. Similarly, women police officers have not always been positively received by the public, attesting to the cultural norm that women do not generally follow a professional career.

Progress in the development of a credible local police force has not come without problems. In 1999, there were 208 complaints lodged against the Kosovo police force. 57 per cent of the complaints were judged valid and 12 per cent of this number were on officers involved in criminal activity. This means that 0.5 per cent of those trained are becoming involved in criminal activity. The main activities that the officers were involved in were police shooting and firearms offences. The complaints were lodged primarily from CivPol (67 per cent) and the public (19 per cent), with none from KPS officers themselves.

KPS projects that there will be at least 6000 basic police officers and 1200 first line supervisors by December 2002. There will be 700 corrections officers by May 2001 and 150 firefighters by November 2001. So far, 3658 KPS graduates have been deployed and 200 are in basic training. KPS graduates have also been deployed to

FYROM and South Serbia to assist in crisis management. The patrol and operations aspect is currently behind schedule, but they will meet the goal. In addition, they have already transited to using more KPS instructors in the academy—currently around 20.

The success of the programme has largely been attributed to the immense international support. Apart from the two key actors, the EU, NATO, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Organization for Migration have contributed training materials, expertise or financial resources to KPS. Bennett believes that the KPS will be a model for future experiences.

Lessons from International Police Task Force (IPTF)—Souren Seraydarian, UNMIBH, Sarajevo

Seraydarian remarked that the Dayton peace accords may have ended the violence, but they certainly have not ended the war. UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was created to establish a sustainable rule of law. Action was taken on three different levels—individual officers, institutions and the interplay between the rule of law and society. There can be no stability in the Balkans without putting the Balkans within a larger European construct. The involvement of the OSCE through its assistance programmes in judiciary and rule of law, the EU and its reconstruction projects, the UN through policing, and the Stabilization Force (NATO and Partnership for Peace) provision of security show that this process has already begun. Nevertheless, ultimate success in the Balkans depends on local leadership and the full implementation of the accords.

UNMIBH aims by 2002 to create individual integrity, civil law agencies which meet international standards, and concentrate on judicial reform over the police. To achieve this, several core programmes have been set in place. They include police reforms, police restructuring and cooperation between police and the justice system. Consequently, it is necessary to coordinate with ICITAP, the local police force and UNMIBH's own police force. Beyond 2002, UNMIBH hopes that there will be full minority representation in all of the law enforcement agencies, a full implementation of UNMIBH core mandates and that follow-ups will be properly conducted to ensure that the achievements that have been made will not be lost. Currently, UNMIBH is working on establishing a regional police training programme that will include Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and possibly Romania.

It is essential for the international community to continue its support and provide assistance in all fields, not just military and policing, but in fields such as forensic science. Exit strategies should also be clearly defined.

Comment—Eric Scheye, UN CivPol Unit, New York

Scheye offered a review of some of his previous experiences in Bosnia. Politicians in Bosnia remain corrupt, with many that had or continue to have involvement in organized crime. This is an illustration of a state that is still in transition. In the

absence of a rule of law, foreign investment and development, the UN will stay in a stricken country for a long time. Hence, before discussing how coordination could be done, it is imperative to first define what should be done to encourage local reconstruction.

CivPol may have a difficult task in transforming the local police force from a corrupt, non-democratic institution to one that is democratic and uncorrupted. This is particularly difficult when democratic policing is not part of the institution legacy. Further, CivPol has to accomplish this without assistance from local leadership, especially when the leadership is comprised of a self-serving clique. It is therefore necessary to simultaneously remove the corrupt few in power while trying to establish a sustainable rule of law. Thus, objective enforcement rather than neutrality must be employed. It is inevitable that CivPol will become engulfed in the politics of the local country.

Discussion:

It is important to state end goals and it is equally important to draw a close link between the police and the judiciary to ensure, in part, economic growth of the stricken country. Both local involvement and a cohesive regional strategy are key to success.

The participants had specific technical questions regarding the correlation between a lower success rate and a real political environment. They also wanted to know how the failure of KPS officers to complain against their fellow officers compared with other forces in the more democratically-advanced countries.

During the discussion that followed, a point was raised that the issue of training judges and prosecutors also be addressed. Otherwise, there is little value in training a police force when they can not move beyond the arrest stage. It was asked whether it was the job of the international community to produce a better police force without bias. One participant brought up the fact that the UN does not have the capacity nor a comparative advantage in training judges and prosecutors and should not start doing so. Rather it should leave that to some other organization, for example, the OSCE. On the issue of the purpose of training a police force, it was argued that there are certain elements of policing that are universal and it would be advisable if there were some commonality. As such, it would be advantageous if there was a model to follow.

SESSION IV: COORDINATION WITHIN REGIONAL OPERATIONS

Planning coordination of police operations under EU leadership—Geir Hilmarsen, WEU, Brussels

Geir Hilmarsen identified four parameters in EU planning for police operations: identifying the problem; identifying what was required to solve the problem; providing specific equipment and personnel to achieve that goal; and the testing of solutions. Accurate early warning is also vital.

The police and the military complement one another. Police are skilled at intelligence and could provide a useful source of information to a peace operation. Police should be permanently assigned to planning headquarters and other offices (e.g., the Situation Centre, the EU Military Staff and to field offices and missions). Conversely, the military can provide essential support to police, such as unparalleled logistics. New bodies have been created within the EU to integrate the civil and military aspects of crisis management, but so far these only meet at Political and Security Committee/ambassadorial level. Military and police planning must go hand-in-hand at all levels. Decision making for both police and non-police aspects must be coordinated.

The EU distinguishes robust policing (executive tasks) from other missions (e.g., monitoring or training missions). While there is no doubt that the EU will achieve its goal of having 5000 police readily deployable by 2003, it is more questionable whether the EU will manage to have 1000 deployable within 30 days. Due to its division into three distinct pillars, the EU's structure poses inherent challenges to coordination. It is essential that no single nation be able to dominate the emerging EU involvement in crisis management. The MAPE example shows that division of responsibility between different nations does not work.

The Feira and Helsinki European Councils set very tough goals, but work can be done at several levels to achieve these targets. Professional planning staff are needed to compensate for the lack of coherent policy resulting from a rotating presidency and it is necessary that these staff be equal in status to the military planning staff. Also, police planning must be linked to other planning cells. It is essential that 'lessons learned' become 'lessons applied', so officers with CivPol experience should be given senior positions. The whole process could be carried out in a higher political framework.

Leadership, division of labour and specialization within police operations—Sven Fredriksen, Danish Police, Copenhagen

Fredriksen commented that the suggestions made in the Brahimi Report are not new, but if money, momentum and support are given then it would greatly enhance the UN's ability to react to crisis situations. He welcomed the suggestion that the police unit be independent from military command. It was essential that police commanders in the field report directly to the head of the UN mission, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG).

He also welcomed the EU's commitment to provide police for peace operations. The reason police are essential is that they are more accustomed to dealing with the public than the armed forces, as well as being trained and professional observers. Policing is a complex and difficult job even in a domestic setting. It requires professional staff, good management and plenty of equipment. Though it is often overlooked by policy makers, the police are as professional as the military, and they do not need micro-management. It would be better to provide police with a strategy, and then give police commanders a free rein to act upon that strategy. Giving a vague mandate is not enough and cannot be compensated for by civilian oversight.

It is usually best if policing operations can be carried out under the UN umbrella, as the UN has a global mandate and expertise. However, other global players (e.g., the EU) must also show that they have the will and the desire to work under a UN mandate. If the mandates are not clear it would be better that the mission did not deploy. Resources must be used efficiently. In Kosovo, where the police were required to both establish the rule of law and set up a local force, UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) subcontracted training of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to OSCE while UNMIK carried out law enforcement tasks. This represents a perfect division of labour. Indeed, the KPS was the best example of a success story in Kosovo, and a model to others.

When bringing in specialists (e.g., forensic officers) for a mission, it may be necessary to have a team from a single nation, as it is essential that they share a methodology. Perhaps each country could contribute one rotation—six months with personnel from country A, six months with personnel from country B, and so on. While this is contrary to the *modus operandi* of the UN, it is essential if a mission is to succeed. It is also necessary to utilize the unique strengths of different states.

Turning to organized crime, it was noted that this is difficult to combat in any context. It requires skilled policing and especially expert intelligence. In many post-conflict societies (particularly the Balkans) organized crime is endemic. Expectations are often too high: multinational or foreign police force cannot be expected to make quick progress against organized crime.

A good example of cooperation between police and military forces is UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo. It was based upon the equality of the two forces. They went on joint patrols, and the police intervened in crimes, while the soldiers stepped in when the police encountered violent situations which were beyond their capability.

Bilateral assistance programmes and regional police operations: the case of MAPE—Lt. Col. Francesco Bruzzese, MAPE, Brussels

MAPE is an advice and training mission made up of police officers from 23 WEU member states. It was deployed to Albania after the collapse of that country's economy and the ensuing political crisis. Its mandate is to rebuild and modernize the Albanian police and to establish training facilities for all ranks. It has assisted the Ministry of Public Order (MOPO) develop a robust strategic plan for the reform of the police. MAPE has trained 7000 general police officers (over half the force) and trained a number of specialist officers and indigenous police trainers.

On 1 June 2001 WEU will hand over responsibility for training, advice and institution building to the EU. The Commission will carry out the project under the Community Assistance Programme for the Western Balkans ensuring the necessary continuity between MAPE activities and the initiation of the new programme. The police force is now out of the emergency, but it will still have to face widespread corruption, organized crime and the illegal spread of weapons.

A specific chapter of MAPE's mandate instructs it to seek coordination with other international actors. When MAPE arrived in Albania, there were 30 assistance programmes including 12 bilateral programmes—8 by EU member-states. They were unable to agree on a joint policy or plan of action and contradictory policies were in evidence. Coordination was therefore vital, and in October 1998 the Friends of Albania Group was created under the joint chairmanship of the EU presidency and the OSCE Chairman-in-office, which brought together bilateral donors, IOs and other organizations. A few months later the International Steering Committee was created to coordinate the activities of mission operating in the law and order field. Since then a database of international donors has been created and joint working groups with bilateral missions established.

The lesson to be drawn from this is that if the international community wants to take responsibility for crisis management it must do so with a comprehensive package covering all the military and non-military aspects of the crisis. There must be a lead organization; tools must be ready; and coordination is vital. Bilateral assistance must fit into a coordinating framework and this framework must be put in place immediately upon arrival in the host country. Coordinating bodies should be defined at political and working levels, with coordination enjoined in mission mandates. The international community should demonstrate a capacity for coherent synergistic effort that can act as an example for the host country.

Discussion:

Recreating institutions and establishing the rule of law are essential in building peace in post-conflict societies. Combating organized crime is a key part of this task as it tends to feed political and institutional corruption. Consequently, the fight against organized crime is now high on the political agenda in IOs. However, it was noted that while this raises the profile of police in peace operations, it also raises challenges for peace operations. It requires working closely with some very unsavoury characters. It was noted that just because one negotiates with a particular group does not mean one supports them. Another problem is that the leading criminals are often the leading politicians in post-conflict societies, and consequently attacking their interests can undermine the rehabilitation process. Questions arise as to the investigation, prosecution and incarceration of criminals.

One limitation for UN CivPol is that they are confined by the peacekeeping model, and in peace operations crime-fighting is a lower priority than peacekeeping. The best way to fight crime is through coordination. However, coordination is very difficult. Decisions must be made by commanders on the ground, and these commanders must liaise regularly. Within the EU it would be necessary to unite issues crossing pillars II and III to help combat organized crime.

The creation of an EU police unit has been swift. Some wanted to see the police subsumed under the military; others wanted it to be entirely independent and parallel. Instead the EU opted to integrate the two structures on an equal footing. It was noted that having a group represented on a staff does not mean that the rest of the staff will understand the capabilities of that group. For example, the top ranks of the military

are often unaware that military police are trained in exactly the skills that those organizing peace operations look for in CivPols.

It is likely that the first EU police mission will be under a UN mandate and hence will be planned by the UN. Just like the military, the police must plan for worst case scenarios. It may be the case that the EU carries out a non-UN-led mission, and consequently the EU must prepare for the possibility that the UN's structures will not be available to them. Similarly, if the EU is to be able to deploy their forces rapidly, the logistical and planning processes must be done in advance.

The issue of measuring success in peace operations in general was raised. One suggestion was that a mission could be said to be successful if the region in which the peace operation operated was able to attract foreign investment. In reality it is often the case that once the region stops making headlines the mission is deemed a success. Success depends upon a respect for law and order must be engendered within society, and to achieve this visible and public policing and response to crimes is essential, whether it is carried out by local police or by CivPol from a peace operation. Creating new police requires a lot of money, as they demand housing, equipment, transport and police stations. Furthermore, if police are to resist the temptations of crime and corruption, decent wages must be paid.

The UN's job is to build an institution from the top down, and missions have often failed to draw adequate budgets that cover all the minutiae of running a police force, because budgetary experts were not included in a mission. DPKO fails here, and these roles would better be handled by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Once these institutions are created DPKO can withdraw, while other bodies such as UNDP will take over. It is essential these other bodies be on the ground from the beginning, however. It is also important to train local managers to take over these institutions.

The importance of employing professionals and specialists to deal with questions of logistics, as opposed to leaving this important issue to diplomats, was stressed. Wars are won and peace is achieved through logistics. Pre-planning is also essential, yet until recently it did not exist among UN police. Thus, in Kosovo the UN were given the job of policing on 10 June 1999, and by 12 June were expected to be implementing this mandate. There was no preparation, however, and so this was impossible.

APPENDIX I

AGENDA

Welcome and Opening Remarks—Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Director, SIPRI

SESSION I: COORDINATING POLICING ENDS AND MEANS

Policing Europe or independent European policing: the role of regional organizations in police operations—Dr. Renata Dwan, SIPRI, Stockholm

Policymaking and practical coordination between the UN and regional organizations—Michael Jorsback, UN CivPol Unit, New York, and Michael Matthiessen European Council Policy Unit, Brussels

Comment: Halvor Hartz, Norwegian Police, Oslo

Session II: Coordination in CivPol training

Options for CivPol training in Europe—Arto Rajala, Permanent Representative of Finland to the EU

Training for specialized functions—Lt. Col. François-Xavier Bourges, Ministry of Defence, Paris

Comment: Barrie Meyers, REACT Unit, OSCE, Vienna
Robert Perito, ICITAP, Washington

SESSION III: COORDINATION IN LOCAL POLICE EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The Kosovo experience—Steve Bennett, Kosovo Police School, Pristina

Lessons from IPTF—Souren Seraydarian, UNMIBH, Sarajevo

Comment: Eric Scheye, UN CivPol Unit, New York

SESSION IV: COORDINATION WITHIN REGIONAL OPERATIONS

Planning coordination of police operations under EU leadership—Geir Hilmarsen, WEU, Brussels

Leadership, division of labour and specialization within police operations—Sven Fredriksen, Danish Police, Copenhagen

Bilateral assistance programmes and regional police operations: the case of MAPE—Lt. Col. Francesco Bruzzese, MAPE, Brussels

APPENDIX II

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Steve Bennett	Kosovo Police School
Joel Brorsson	Justice Ministry, Sweden
Lt. Col. Francois-Xavier Bourges	Defence Ministry, France
Lt. Col. Francesco Bruzzese del Pozzo	Western European Union Multinational Advisory Police Element for Albania
Renata Dwan	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Sven Fredriksen	Danish Police
Albert Goedendorp	The Association of European Police Colleges
Carl Hallergard	Council of the European Union, Policy Unit
Annika Hansen	International Institute for Strategic Studies
Halvor Hartz	Norwegian Police
Anna-Karin Holm Ericson	Civilian Crisis Management Committee Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden
Geir Hilmarsen	Western European Union Multinational Advisory Police Element for Albania
Michael Jorsback	Civilian Police Division, UN DPKO
James Martin	Department of Justice, Equity & Law Reform, Ireland
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Robert Perito	US Justice Department
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