Old and Abandoned Chemical Weapons under the CWC: Paper 7

I. Introduction

It is generally agreed that under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)the destruction of existing chemical weapon (CW) stockpiles will be a majordisarmament task for the first 10 years after the Convention enters intoforce - in exceptional cases an extension to 15 years might be possible.

In contrast to this, the problems related to old chemical weapons (OCW)and abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) will not pose such a significant andpertinent risk to the objectives of the Convention, but there are stilltechnical and technological challenges in coping with ACW and OCW as wellas legal questions. States which already have experience with the discoveryand destruction of OCW have realized how expensive this can be.

Although CW may be old and no longer usable in military terms (e.g., recoveredfrom former battlefields or from the sea), they still pose a risk to peopleand the environment. OCW may be 'leftovers' from the two world wars, whichStates Parties may unwittingly have failed to declare when entering theCWC, or they may be discovered as abandoned ammunition at some later date.OCW may be obsolete or leaking, but the toxic agent can still be active.

The discovery of OCW and ACW may create political tension between statesand, as the follow-on expert negotiations in The Hague have proved, enormouscosts may be involved in verifying the declaration and destruction of theseweapons - as required under the CWC. A State Party which is identified ashaving abandoned CW will incur financial responsibilities, at the very least,and may also face political difficulties. If ACW and OCW are not declaredprior to entry into force of the CWC, the Organisation for the Prohibitionof Chemical Weapons (OPCW) may have to cope with a situation in which OCWor ACW declarations occur after entry into force of the Convention therebycreating demands on both budget and manpower resources as internationalinspection activities are forced to be conducted.

There are essentially four general categories of OCW: (a) abandonedchemical weapons (ACW), (b) CW disposed of at sea or on land, (c)discovered CW, and (d) OCW produced before 1946.

II. OCW and ACW under the CWC

In looking at the history of the negotiation of the CWC two possiblesolutions to the problems of OCW and ACW become apparent: (a) toleave responsibility for destruction of the OCW with the party that discoversthem, or (b) to leave responsibility for destruction with the partywhich abandoned the OCW and to carry out destruction on the territory ofthe party which has discovered them.

Closely related to the problem of OCW is the issue of a clear definitionof the term 'jurisdiction and control' under the CWC. The following questionsare often asked: Would it be possible to establish responsibility for CWabandoned by states which were involved in military conflicts and had occupiedforeign territory? Would such responsibility also include financial responsibilityand the demand for technical support? The CWC had to find a compromise basedon the following premises:

(a) establishing a clear procedure for the treatment of OCW, including a definition of OCW,

(b) preparing for coping with ACW,

(c) assigning legal responsibility for destruction of OCW and ACW,

(d) setting up procedures for OCW destruction verification,

(e) providing guidance to State Parties as to how to deal with new discoveries of OCW, after the entry into force of the CWC, particularly procedures for declaration, storage and destruction, and


(f) finding some co-operative mechanism for sharing the costs for destruction and verification, especially in the case of the ACW.

Definitions and declarations under the CWC

Under the CWC the relation of the articles dealing with General Obligations(Article I), Definitions and Criteria (Article II), Declarations (ArticleIII), Chemical Weapons (Article IV) and the relevant provisions of the Annexon Implementation and Verification provide a procedural framework for copingwith OCW and ACW.

Article I defines the general obligation of a State Party to the Conventionwhich has possessed CW before 1946 (treated now as OCW), or which has hadACW in the past, in the following two paragraphs:[1]

Paragraph (2) Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons itowns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdictionor control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Paragraph (3) Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weaponsit abandoned on the territory of another State Party, in accordance withthe provisions of this Convention.

For States Parties with OCW and ACW the definitions under Article II arerelevant:

'old chemical weapons':

(a) Chemical weapons which were produced before 1925; or

(b) Chemical weapons produced in the period between 1925 and 1946that have deteriorated to such an extent that they can no longer be usedas chemical weapons.

'abandoned chemical weapons':

Chemical weapons, including old chemical weapons, abandoned by a State after1 January 1925 on the territory of another State without the consent ofthe latter.

There is also a link between the question of 'usability' in category (b)above and Article II's definition of CW (such OCW can never again be usedas chemical weapons).[2] This question of 'usability'was not defined in detail under the CWC, its elaboration instead becamethe task of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) for the OPCW. There wasalso a clear understanding that ACW are weapons which have been abandonedafter 1925 (i.e., ACW dating from the post-World War II period fall underthis definition).

Bearing these definitions in mind, under Article III a future State Partyto the CWC is required to provide the following declarations regarding oldchemical weapons:

'old chemical weapons'

Declare whether it has on its territory old chemical weapons and provideall available information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 3, ofthe Verification Annex

and for abandoned chemical weapons:

'abandoned chemical weapons'

Declare whether there are abandoned chemical weapons on its territory andprovide all available information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph8, of the Verification Annex;

Declare whether it has abandoned chemical weapons on the territory of otherStates and provide all available information in accordance with Part IV(B), paragraph 10, of the Verification Annex.

There is a clear distinction between a State Party with ACW on its territoryand a State Party that has itself abandoned CW at some point. All declarationrequirements must be met not later than 30 days after the CWC enters intoforce for a State Party.

CW buried or dumped at sea

One of the main difficulties related to CW buried or dumped at sea was tofind a formula under the CWC which would not bring future States Partieswhich had conducted such disposal operations in the past, especially afterWorld War II, into conflict with their obligations under the Convention,and which would not present insurmountable financial and technical burdens.The solution was to introduce a cut-off date for responsibility (declarations,verification and destruction) for CW which had been disposed of in sucha fashion, and the date chosen was set as late as possible. Articles III(Declarations) and IV (Chemical Weapons) of the CWC state:

The provisions of this Article [Article III, and also Article IV] and therelevant provisions of Part IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at thediscretion of a State Party, apply to chemical weapons buried on its territoryprior to 1 January 1977 and which remain buried, or which had been dumpedat sea prior to 1 January 1985.

States Parties which dumped CW at sea before 1985 or buried CW before 1977will thus not be forced to declare, dig up and destroy these weapons. Theyear 1977 was chosen in response to a specific case. In 1992 Austria submitteda paper to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) describing a 1949-50 campaignin which German World War II CW munitions located on Austrian territorywere collected, sorted and provisionally buried.[3] During1974-76 more than 28 000 grenades and rocket projectiles were moved to 'long-term'storage. These CW will not be covered by the CWC.

III. Provisions for identification and verification of OCW and ACW

Old chemical weapons

The time schedules for declarations by a State Party are set in such a waythat there is a clear distinction between OCW which have been discoveredand are known to exist at the time the CWC enters into force, and possiblediscoveries at a later date.

1. For OCW produced before 1925, the State Party shall submit all availablerelevant information (including, as far as possible, location, type, quantityand current condition) to the Technical Secretariat of the InternationalOrganization not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into forcefor that State Party.

2. For OCW produced in the period 1925-46, each State Party shall submitto the OPCW, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force,a declaration in which it states whether it has on its territory OCW, andprovides all available information on the matter.[4]

3. In cases where the State Party discovers OCW after the Convention entersinto force, it is obliged to submit the required information not later than180 days after discovery to the Technical Secretariat.

On the basis of the information provided, the Technical Secretariat is obligedto conduct an initial inspection to verify the information and, most importantly,to determine whether the material meets the OCW definition.

The question of 'usability' and verification

As mentioned above, the PrepCom was required to develop 'Guidelines to determinethe usage of chemical weapons produced between 1925 and 1946, in accordancewith Part IV(B), paragraph 5, of the Verification Annex'. Prior to November1994, an 'Expert Group on old and abandoned chemical weapons'[5]focused in its meetings on:

(a) definition of declaration formats for OCW produced before 1925, between 1925 and 1946, and ACW;

(b) identification of criteria for determining the deterioration/usability of CW produced between 1925 and 1946; and


(c) a verification regime for OCW produced between 1925 and 1946. The Expert Group began by developing criteria and guidelines for establishing 'usability'.

The main problem was to elaborate (based on the definition of chemicalweapons under Article II of the CWC)[6] an assessmentof deterioration and usability which would address toxic chemicals, precursors,munitions, sub-munitions and devices and any equipment defined as chemicalweapons.

With regard to the envisaged verification regime for OCW produced between1925 and 1946 two interpretations are emerging:[7] (a)application of both the destruction obligations and verification provisions(as outlined under Part IV(A) of the CWC Verification Annex); and (b)application of a flexible verification regime depending on the risk assessmentand not involving universal application of the timing requirements for initialinspections as outlined under Part IV(A), together with verification ofthe destruction of OCW by continuous on-site monitoring and the presenceof inspectors. (Verification would be adjusted against assessment of therisk which OCW pose to the object and purpose of the CWC.) The Expert Grouphas developed: (a) declaration formats for OCW and ACW, (b)format for information on OCW on the territory of a State Party, (c)format for information on ACW on the territory of another State Party (abandoningState Party), (d) format for information on ACW on the territoryof a State Party (territorial State Party - i.e., a State Party on whoseterritory there are ACW), and (e) format for information to the TechnicalSecretariat on methods used for destruction/disposal of OCW produced before1925.[8] The declaration formats are incorporated intothe Declaration Handbook developed by the PTS.[9]

In early 1994 the Expert Group presented a possible solution[10]to the problem of assessing the usability of OCW (produced between 1925and 1946), based upon the view that deterioration of such weapons cannotbe expressed in a simple 'yes' or 'no' fashion. This concept is based onthe understanding that there is a degree of deterioration within a continuumranging from 'undeteriorated' to 'totally deteriorated' and that measurementof what is deemed to be an 'usable' and 'unusable' OCW should express thedegree of deterioration. However, it has to be kept in mind, that thereis a certain (maybe) measurable point which will separate 'usable' and 'unusable'.

'Usability' and 'deterioration'

When defining the 'usability' of OCW the approach chosen was based on theCWC's definition of 'chemical weapons' and 'old chemical weapons' underArticle II. CW are defined, together or separately, as: (a) toxicchemicals and their precursors, (b) specifically designed munitionsand devices, and (c) any equipment specifically designed for usedirectly in connection with CW.

The understanding is that when any item meets at least one of the threeparts of the definition of a CW, it is a CW, and that irrespective of howmany of its components meet any of the three parts of the definition individuallythis chemical weapon should be assessed as a single CW. Additionally, theunderstanding is that: (a) there is no degree of usability--an itemis either usable or not; (b) the degree of deterioration is the basisfor elaborating on usability; and (c) if the usability of a componentis unknown or cannot be demonstrated, it should be assumed that the componentis usable. The presence or absence of equipment is not deemed to have aprimary function, but only moderates the assessment with respect to chemicals/munitionspresent at an OCW site.

The concept for treatment of OCW produced between 1925 and 1946 is basedon a two-step approach, which includes: first, determination of thedegree of deterioration and then a decision on 'usability' or 'unusability';and second, a risk assessment (assessing the risk which this OCWwill pose to the CWC) to decide on the appropriate verification measurementsto be applied.

The concept to estimate the 'usability' is based on the understanding that:

(a) OCW is a status declared by a State Party for CW produced between 1925 and 1946 that might (or might not) be endorsed by the Technical Secretariat on the basis of usability (yes/no);

(b) usability is the result of a combination of usability of the different components of a chemical weapon - if any of the components of a CW are not usable, the CW itself would be considered unusable;

(c) the usability of a stockpile of OCW will take the configuration and composition of the stockpile into account; and


(d) assessment of usability is independent of factors such as location, quantity, and the like.

The Expert Group has developed guidelines for the initial inspectionby the Technical Secretariat of sites with OCW produced between 1925 and1946 which include activities focused upon confirming:

(a) the inventory of declared OCW,

(b) its location,

(c) that the OCW were produced between 1925 and 1946,

(d) assessment of the degree of deterioration and non-usability, and


(e) data which is collected for assessment of usability and for risk assessment.

For confirming that the OCW were produced between 1925 and 1946 the followingactivities might be applicable:

(a) checking recognizable labels, markings, design features, and so on;

(b) reviewing production information, as available;

(c) reviewing evidence provided by witnesses, as available;

(d) cross-checking with data contained in the OCW database of the Technical Secretariat; and


(e) scrutinizing circumstantial evidence such as historical evidence (e.g., information on former testing activities or incidents of use of CW in the past) and types of toxic chemicals present in the OCW.

When assessing the degree of deterioration consideration should be givento:

(a) properties of the toxic chemicals in the OCW,

(b) degree of deterioration of toxic agent present in the OCW,

(c) degree of deterioration of the munitions, and


(d) degree of deterioration of equipment defined as CW.

The usability assessment has to be performed by the Technical Secretariatsince the inspectors will only collect the information required, such as:

(a) the total amount of OCW present,

(b) the diversity of OCW present, and


(c) the operational characteristics of these OCW, including ease of and hazards involved in extraction of the toxic agent(s), as well as the utility of any such extracts as CW.

As a result of the risk assessment the Technical Secretariat has to decideupon the frequency, duration and intensity of any subsequent inspectionin order to assure that: (a) the OCW are destroyed as agreed in thedestruction plan; (b) no OCW have been removed except for their destruction;and (c) no process has been conducted or activities undertaken withthe OCW that would modify their status as OCW.

Abandoned chemical weapons

The CWC makes a clear distinction between a State Party on whose territorythere are ACW - the territorial State Party - and a State Party which hasACW on the territory of another State Party - the abandoning State Party- in the following manner:

1. The territorial State Party is obliged, not later than 30 days afterthe CWC enters into force, to submit to the Technical Secretariat all availablerelevant information (including, as far as possible, location, type, quantityand current condition).

2. In cases where the discovery of ACW occurs after the Convention entersinto force, the information must be submitted not later than 180 days afterdiscovery.

3. The abandoning State Party is obliged to submit all available informationconcerning the ACW to the Technical Secretariat within 30 days.

The Technical Secretariat (TS) is asked to conduct an initial inspectionto verify the information and to determine whether systematic monitoringis required and also, if necessary, to determine the identity of the abandoningstate and to establish evidence relating to the abandonment.

The CWC gives a territorial State Party the right to request the abandoningState Party to enter into consultations for the purpose of destroying theabandoned chemical weapons in co-operation with it. It is important to notethat the abandoning State Party is obliged to provide 'all necessary financial,technical, expert, facility as well as other resources' for destroying theACW.

If the abandoning state cannot be identified or is not a party to the Convention,the territorial State Party may request the OPCW and other States Partiesto provide assistance with destruction of the material.

For the initial inspection the purpose is to develop guidelines for inspectionactivities on a case-by-case basis. These guidelines should be adjustedto the object and purpose of the CWC and be flexible. If the ACW also meetthe definition of OCW, inspections should be adjusted to the 'usability'and current status.

However, besides the progress made in the Expert Group on Old and AbandonedCW in The Hague during the past 18 months, there are still issues not finallyagreed upon including:

1. For the development of criteria for determining 'usability' with respect to CW produced between 1925 and 1946 there is still no final consensus.

2. Guidelines for destruction and verification requirements for ACW are still not finally agreed upon.

3. Costs of verification with respect to OCW and ACW under a cost-risk balance are still being debated.

4. ACW buried on the territory of a State Party after 1976 or sea dumped in the territorial waters of a State Party after 1984 in the context of a possible challenge inspection and its implications for the TS are still under debate.[11]

IV. Destruction of OCW and ACW under the CWC

Destruction of OCW produced before 1925

If after the initial inspection the Technical Secretariat confirms thatthe CW discovered were produced before 1925, they shall be treated as toxicwastes. The State Party shall inform the OPCW of the steps being taken todestroy or otherwise dispose of these wastes in accordance with nationallegislation. The state will also be required to inform the Technical Secretariatconcerning:

(a) the destruction/disposal of these OCW during the past year by reporting annually;

(b) the name(s) of demilitarization and destruction/disposal facility(ies), if any; and


(c) the methods used for the destruction/disposal as toxic waste.[12]

Destruction of OCW produced between 1925 and 1946

As outlined under Part IV(B) of the CWC Verification Annex, a 'State Partyshall destroy old chemical weapons that have been confirmed by the TechnicalSecretariat as meeting the definition in Article II, paragraph 5 (b) [producedbetween 1925 and 1946], in accordance with Article IV and Part IV(A) ofthis Annex'. This means in general, the destruction and verification requirementsfor 'normal' CW have to be applied. Upon the request of a State Party itis possible to modify the provisions on time-limit and order of destruction,but only after the approval of the Executive Council. With respect to thedestruction of OCW produced between 1925 and 1946 (which under the termsof the CWC has to be finished within 10 years of entry into force for theState Party) a particular country's situation must, of course, be takeninto consideration. For example, a country with OCW might not have a CWdestruction facility. In such a situation, other destruction sites mightbe designated. The verification regime will then also apply to such facilities.

Another important point is related to possible discoveries of individualOCW items, especially after the first declaration by the State Party. Ifthe State Party decides for safety reasons to destroy them in situ,it will have to report this with respect to Part IV(B) of the VerificationAnnex under the CWC[13] in its biannual declaration.

Discovered toxic chemicals, not scheduled under the CWC and produced inbulk between 1925 and 1946, which could be used as CW, but for which theintention of production is not known, shall be treated as toxic wastes.[14]

Destruction of ACW

Destruction of ACW should be carried out in relation to the provisions underPart IV(B) of the Verification Annex. The territorial State Party and theabandoning State Party will have to establish a plan for destruction ofACW, taking into account the possible risks posed to the object and purposeof the CWC. The Executive Council has to approve the plan, including possibleproposed suspensions of selected provisions for verification. The destructionhas to be carried out in accordance with the principles and methods fordestruction specified under Article IV,[15] and PartIV(A)[16]. ACW discovered prior to entry into forceof the CWC shall be destroyed as early as possible but not later than 10years after entry into force. If a territorial State Party requests an extensionof the deadline for completion of destruction, the Executive Council hasto approve such a request. Annual reports from both the territorial andabandoning State Party concerning progress in destruction of the ACW haveto be submitted to the Technical Secretariat.

Two exceptions are foreseen in the destruction obligation: (a) ifthe abandoned CW also meets the definition of OCW (produced in the periodbetween 1925 and 1946), it is possible to suspend the application of theprovisions for destruction upon request of the territorial State Party;and (b) if the ACW do not meet this definition of OCW, the territorialState Party may ask the Executive Council for modification of the provisionsgoverning both the time limit and the order of destruction. Both the territorialand the abandoning State Party may conclude agreements or arrangements forcarrying out the destruction of ACW between themselves.

V. Technologies for destruction

The discovery, dismantlement and safe destruction of chemical weapons,OCW included, has been a significant problem since their first use in WorldWar I. Up until the end of the 1960s both agents and munitions were destroyedby methods now considered environmentally unsound. These included open-pitburning, land burial and ocean dumping, all of which are now no longer inuse owing to a variety of environmental and safety legislation; they arealso prohibited under the CWC. (This paper does not present a detailed overviewof the various destruction technologies applicable to old and abandonedCW).[17]

From a general technical point of view, the whole destruction process posessignificant challenges such as:

(a) safe disassembly of the explosives and propellants,

(b) disposal of the removed explosive components and propellants,

(c) accessing the agent cavity,

(d) disposal of the toxic agent,

(e) disposal of the munition bodies, and


(f) disposal of the process generated wastes.

In addition, it must be kept in mind the fact that old or abandoned CWmay differ from 'normal CW' in the following ways:

1. It is sometimes difficult to differentiate between chemical and conventional munitions.

2. Difficulties remain in identifying the origins of OCW.

3. Explosive charges, sometimes still active and unable to be removed, may be present.

4. OCW very often contain a complex mixture of different agents that have already undergone decomposition.


5. The discovery of OCW munitions is completely unpredictable, a fact which has a major impact upon planning and destruction.

Bearing in mind the available experience of coping with OCW, the followingtechnological steps are of major importance in the process of discoveryand follow-up destruction:

(a) reconnaissance and locating,

(b) unearthing and identification,

c) removal and transportation, (d) intermediate storage,

(e) preparation of the munition for demilitarization, and


(f) demilitarization.

Destruction technologies applicable to OCW are well-known and alreadyin use. (Table 1 in the annexe presents a compilation of generally applicabledestruction technologies.) On the other hand, it must be recognized thatdestruction of chemical agents and munitions has to be conducted under highstandards of health and environmental safety. The protection of the peopleinvolved has first priority. The destruction capacities in different countriesfor CW in general, and for OCW in particular, are limited.

Besides the thermal treatment and decomposition of both chemical agentsand munitions there are other techniques which could be used. In view ofthe fact that OCW may occur in large quantities and that different munitiontypes will always be involved 'classic' techniques, including chemical detoxification,have distinct advantages. Destruction techniques discussed as 'alternativedestruction technologies',[18] might provide incentivesfor more intensive studies of their application to OCW destruction. Transportabledestruction units together with a technology which allows on-site dismantlingmight be another option, especially given the fact that OCW may be discoveredat different places in limited quantities. Under such conditions chemicalagent detoxification processes (neutralization or hydrolysis) would be thebest option, although electro-chemical oxidation technologies would alsohave some advantages. One such technique which originally came from wastetreatment in the nuclear industry, is based on an electrochemical processusing nitric acid and silver and a temperature of less than 100 [o]C.[19]

Some states already have significant experience in the destruction of OCW.[20] Among them are: Germany, which possesses a destructionfacility using thermal decomposition (incineration); the USA, which hasrun several destruction campaigns in the past; and Canada, which in 1990-91destroyed mustard gas using incineration, and nerve agents, using neutralizationfollowed by incineration. In addition, it should be kept in mind that theUnited Nations Special Commission on Iraq's recently acquired experiencein the handling and destruction of leaking and obsolete CW munition maybe of interest in respect to the problem of the treatment of OCW.[21]

V. National Authority obligations related to OCW and ACW

The National Authority of a State Party with old or abandoned CW willbe involved in or responsible for preparing and co-ordinating the followingactivities:

(a) preparing the first declarations (after 30 of entry into force) based on the declaration formats;

(b) preparing the initial inspection and escorting the inspectors to the site where OCW or ACW are located;

(c) destroying or disposing of the declared OCW, if they meet the definition of toxic wastes under Article II, paragraph 5 (a) [produced before 1925] and informing the Technical Secretariat;

(d) destroying OCW, if they meet their definition under Article II, paragraph 5 (b) [produced between 1925 and 1946], based upon an approved destruction plan which includes systematic verification by the OPCW inspectors (prior to Verification Annex, Part IV (A), paragraphs 41 to 43);

(e) negotiating the plan for destruction with the abandoning state in the event of ACW;

(f) requesting assistance from the OPCW or other States Parties, if the abandoning state cannot be identified; and


(g) submission of further declarations in cases where new OCW or ACW discoveries might occur (180 days after discovery).

VI. Conclusions

Owing to the success of the CWC it is obvious that fulfilling one ofthe main obligations under the Convention - to destroy CW produced and stockpiledafter 1 January 1946 - will be of first priority for all CW-possessor StatesParties. Enormous resources, time and inspection efforts will be devotedto verification and compliance monitoring of this destruction. However,the CWC has not been able to solve the problems of both pre- and post-WorldWar II dumping operations and attendant responsibilities.

None the less, the impact which OCW and ACW can have on the verificationdemands and financial outlay of the budget of the future OPCW may be enormous,a fact that is sometimes neglected. In building up the OPCW infrastructureand starting the training of future inspectors there is an element of uncertaintyrelated to OCW and ACW. States are not forced to provide information relatedto such weapons in advance of entry into force of the CWC. In planning andpreparing for the entry into force of the CWC, the Provisional TechnicalSecretariat (PTS) is compiling the available information to create a picturewhich, once States Parties have declared OCW and ACW, will hopefully notbe too far from reality.

An additional aspect of this question relates to old and abandoned chemicalweapons, suspected to be present - but not yet discovered - in developingcountries where military conflicts have taken place in the past 60 years.For example there is, and has been, much concern in African countries, suchas Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique, that ACW will be discovered. Also theAsia-Pacific region is of interest in this respect, a region with a significantWorld War II CW deployment history.

Old and abandoned CW differ greatly from the CW which has been stockpiledsince 1946. They may be old and no longer usable (e.g., recovered from aformer battlefield or unearthed from the soil). There may be no clear evidenceas to what agent they contain, the kind of fuse used or the origin of theammunition. The weapon may be obsolete or already leaking. Handling, transportationand destruction of such OCW is a difficult task, and the requirements ofsafety and public health will have a major impact on destruction. Everypiece of weaponry has to be seen as unique. Destruction of OCW will createcosts much higher than those associated with normal CW destruction. In addition,States Parties with OCW are not always CW possessors, and it will be moredifficult for them to find the technical capabilities to destroy the weapons.

Judging from the information already made public by a few States Parties,the discovery of OCW or ACW will remain an issue of importance for sometime after the CWC enters into force. Future discoveries will keep the subjectof OCW and ACW alive. The experience of some European countries indicatesthat there will never be a 100 per cent certainty for a State Party thatits territory is an 'OCW-and-ACW-free territory'.

The CWC will establish a framework for dealing with OCW and ACW as wellas requirements and responsibilities for their destruction. Procedures foridentifying the origins, status and date of the production of such weapons,as well as an evaluation of their 'usability', the established proceduresunder the CWC will ensure that OCW and ACW are destroyed and that the entireprocess will be supervised and verified by applicable verification measures.

Owing to the fact that not every State Party that discovers OCW will alsohave a destruction facility, there is an urgent need to establish co-operationbetween States Parties under the Convention. Existing destruction capacitiesare limited: nevertheless, the OPCW can provide the umbrella for commonactions. States will, however, remain individually responsible for any actionsrelated to the discovery and destruction of OCW.

States should take seriously the problems related to OCW and ACW. Thereis a need to use the CWC as a window of opportunity for getting rid of bothOCW and ACW, for developing co-operation in general and for exchanging experienceand technical know-how between those states for which this is an issue.

Annexe I. 'Old Chemical Weapons' and 'Abandoned Chemical Weapons' underthe Chemical Weapons Convention

'Old Chemical Weapons' and 'Abandoned Chemical Weapons'

Article I

General Obligations

general obligation to destroy CW (Paragraph 2)

obligation to destroy CW abandoned on the territory of another State Party

(Paragraph 3)

Article II

Definitions and Criteria

                old CW                               abandoned CW                    (a) produced before 1925 (b)        CW, including old CW, abandoned by a    produced in the period between 1925     State Party after 1 January 1946 on      and 1946; deteriorated to such an      the territory of another State Party   

  extent that they can no longer be       without the consent of the latter                  used as CW                                                       

Article III

Declarations

30 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party thefollowing declarations have to be submitted:

(a) Declaration concerning whether it has on its territory old CW, withall available information in accordance with the Verification Annex

(b) Declaration concerning whether there are abandoned CW on its territorywith all available information in accordance with the Verification Annex

(c) Declaration whether it has abandoned CW on the territory of other Stateswith all available information in accordance with the Verification Annex

Exception

The provisions of this Article and the relevant provisions under the VerificationAnnex shall not, at the discretion of a State Party, apply to CW buriedon its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain buried, or whichhad been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985

Article IV

Chemical Weapons

general obligation to destroy CW

Exception

The provisions of this Article and the relevant provisions under the VerificationAnnex shall not, at the discretion of a State Party, apply to CW buriedon its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain buried, or whichhad been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985

Table 1. Technologies for destruction of chemical agents

Technologies for the destruction of chemical warfare agents

1. Thermal detoxification