The Chemical Weapons Convention and Discrete Organic Chemicals: Paper 18

RONALD G. SUTHERLAND, THOMAS STOCK, THOMAS KURZIDEM,
PATRICIA RADLER AND YORK VON LERSNER

Bad Homburg, Germany
8- 10 September 1995


Part 6 of Article VI of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) states thatfacilities specified
in Part IX of the Verification Annex shall be subject to data monitoringand eventual on- site
verification. Part IX of the Verification Annex is the 'Regime for otherchemical production
facilities' and there is a declaration requirement for:

- more than 200 tonnes of unscheduled discrete organic chemicals (DOCs)
produced by synthesis; and
- more than 30 tonnes if the DOC contains the elements Phosphorus, Sulfuror
Fluorine (PSF- Chemicals, PSF- plants)

The CWC text for the above lists excludes 'plant- sites that exclusivelyproduced explosives or
hydrocarbons'.

The CWC defines a DOC as follows:

'Discrete Organic Chemical ' means any chemical belonging to the class ofchemical compounds
consisting of all compounds of carbon except for its oxides, sulfides andmetal carbonates,
identifiable by chemical name, by structural formula, if known, and by ChemicalAbstracts Service
registry number, if assigned.

In principle, there are two problems with this text 1 in that elsewherethe CWC defines
production as 'its formation through chemical reaction' as opposed to 'bysynthesis' and the
DOC category is very broad even allowing for the basic production of hydrocarbonsand
explosives 'exclusively'.

The debate on how one should limit the category of DOCs and on what constitutesa method of production which could be of interest to the implementationof the CWC is still ongoing and of major concern both to the PreparatoryCommission, embryo National Authorities and the chemical industry becauseof its potential impact on declaration and inspections costs. The debateis essential but there is a danger that it could be used to weaken otheraspects of the CWCs verification provisions by developing definitions thatare unnecessarily restrictive.

The main centres of discussions involved Expert Groups under the aegis ofWorking Group B:

- Combined Group of Experts on Industrial Declarations
- Expert Group on Chemical Industry Facilities
- Joint meetings with the Chemical Industry.

In December 1993 an Expert Group discussed the problem of polymers and statedthat only
operations concerning monomers should be declared but that there might bea need for
declarations involving certain types of biopolymers. 2

This was further clarified in a working paper 3 when that group indicatedthat in its view
DOCs should not cover:

- Oligomers and polymers whether or not containing Phosphorus, Sulfur or
Fluorine;
- Products manufactured by chemical modification of natural products thatare
complex mixtures; and
- Chemicals only containing carbon and metal.

and that, within the definition of DOCs, were exclusions for carbon monoxide,carbon
dioxide, carbon disulfide and carbonyl sulphide.

The group further concluded that 'production by synthesis' in Part IX ofthe Verification Annex did not include fermentation. The term hydrocarbonwas taken to be all inclusive, i. e., irrespective of the number of carbonatoms involved. The question of explosives was subjected to extensive analysisand it was suggested that a formal definition be based on the transportof dangerous goods document, ST/ SG/ AC. 10/ 1/ REV 5 for explosives, Class1, division 1: 1 (see Annex I). No conclusions were reached regarding facilitiesproducing rocket propellants.

These issues were further discussed a the second Combined Meeting of theExpert Group on
Chemical Industry Facilities and Industry Representatives in April 1994where it was stated
that: proposals have been made by some delegations to exempt such chemicaloperations as breweries, wineries, various chemicals produced by biologicalprocesses, polymer plants etc. from declaration
requirements. A complete list of candidate plants and facilities types thatshould be considered for
exemption should be drawn up. 4

As far as we are aware no such list exists. This paper included a usefulseries of Industry
Verification Fact Sheets of which number 2 (Biotechnology), 5 (IndustrialDeclaration Forms)
are pertinent to the DOC debate.

The Fourth Report on Chemical Industry Issues 5 did not appear tostate any additional
progress on DOCs apart from further discussions on 'complex mixture', 'biochemicaland
biologically mediated processes ' in Part IX of the Verification Annex andthe definition of
explosives. The Fifth Report 6 did not discuss DOCs and the SixthReport 7 only briefly
discussed the issues by mentioning

(a) 'industrial products having a purity of less than 100 per
cent' these were deemed to be DOCs if characterised by one chemical structure;
(b) biochemical
and biologically mediated processes should only be considered relative toscheduled chemicals;
and
(c) that chapters 29 of the Harmonised Commodity Description and CodingSystem (HS
System) might be of use in identifying facilities that produce DOCs.

The experts also reviewed the problems created by 'Production by synthesis'since the term is undefined in the Convention.

In the Executive Secretarys Retrospective Report 8 from 1994 in referenceto Chemical
Industry Issues noted that there was no new understanding with respect to:

(a) discrete organic chemicals including PSF chemicals;
(b) the definition of production (Paragraph 12( a) of Article II); and
(c) production by synthesis used in Part IX of the Verification Annex.

The Working Groups inability to further develop a common understanding onthese issues is
detailed in their October 1994 Report 9 . The January 1995 meetingof this group concentrated on
the structure and content of a draft model agreement on a Schedule 2 PlantSite and no further
discussion on DOCs emerged. 10

Apart from the combined meeting with industrial representatives there appearsto be little
advance in understanding of DOCs 11 and one of the Expert Groupspriority tasks as laid out in
the Report of the Commission 12 viz.: complete discussions on thetentative understandings in regard to discrete organic chemicals
including PSF chemicals...

It should be clear from the above that the issues involved in developingdeclarations with
respect to Part IX of the Verification Annex are unresolved and there isno agreed understanding
of what must be declared under 'other chemical production facilities'. Atthis time there is only a
minimum level of agreement on what might be excluded in addition to hydrocarbonsand
explosive, e. g., polymer production, beverage fermentation. It should bekept in mind that the
initial concept related to production facilities not presently involvedin Schedule 2 or 3
production but with a capability of conversion of their present productionto compounds of
potential concern to the CWC.

If one makes chemical process capability the guiding principle, the declaration,would be
limited to these discrete organic chemicals that are produced by chemicaltransformations that
could be used in the formation of chemical weapons agents. Three lists ofchemical processes
could be developed based on the intrinsic chemistry involved in schedules1, 2 and 3. Chemical
production facilities would be classified accordingly and an appropriatelist of declarable
discrete organic chemicals prepared.

The following is suggested as a way to indicate a limitation on the declarationrequirement for
DOCs. Declarations are required for any discrete organic chemical producedabove the threshold
and synthesised in a single or multistep process using one or more chemicaltransformation
process described by the Technical Secretariat as one which could be usedin the preparation of
toxic chemicals of interest to the CWC.

A Working Paper submitted by Sweden 13 under the title 'Verificationof the Chemical
Industry within the general pattern of verification for a Chemical WeaponsConvention' could
provide a rational starting point for such an approach.

Chemical Transformation Processes:

1. Alkylation
2. Condensation
3. Dehydrogenation
4. Esterification
5. Halogenation
6. Hydrogenation
7. Isomeration
8. Oxidation
9. Substitution.

The above conversion processes were compiled based on the chemical reactionsrequired to
produce the chemicals which appear on the CWC¥s schedules. Chemicalfacilities not using
such processes could be omitted from these which have to declare their productionof discrete
organic chemicals.

In this approach the onus would be on the National Authority to developa list of chemical
production facilities which would be of no interest to the CWC since therewould be no
possibility of misusing the facility for purposes prohibited by the Convention.The Technical
Secretariat would have to monitor new chemical routes to scheduled chemicalsand arrange to
add other chemical transformation processes to the above list if required.


Footnotes:

1. See Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Declarations,Discrete Organic Chemicals and Toxics, RG Sutherland, T. Kurzidem, T. Stock,P. Radler, 3rd Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementationof the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Noordwijk, Netherlands,May 1995 for a related discussion.
2. PC- V/ B/ WP. 15, Dec. 1993.
3 PC/ VI/ B/ WP. 2.
4 PC- VI/ B/ 7, April 1994.

5 PC- VII/ B/ WP. 7, May 1994.
6 PC- VIII/ B/ WP. 5, Aug. 1994.
7 PC- VIII/ B/ WP. 10, Sept. 1994.
8 PC- IX/ 6, Dec. 1994.
9 PC- IX/ B/ WP. 2, Oct. 1994. 3

10 PC- X/ BWP. 6, Jan. 1995.
11 see Report of the Executive Secretary, PC- XI/ 8, 21 July 1995, paragraphs6.12 and 6.13.
12 PC- XI/ 7, 27 July 1995.
13 CD/ 1053, Feb. 1991.