



The Shadow of the Future Over the BTWC

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The shadow of the future

- Shadow of the past over the present
 - ▶ New information about past programmes
- Shadow of the future over the present
 - ▶ Designer weapons
 - ▶ Biotechnology: enabling technologies & unknown developments
 - ▶ Future security deficits and shortening time delays to switch from peaceful to offensive purposes
 - ▶ New actors
- Great doubts about effectiveness of current disarmament measures to deal with future threats
 - ▶ Acute awareness of own vulnerabilities
 - ▶ Sense of loss of control and manageability of problem
 - ▶ Arms race in BW defence programmes?

Disarmament: The dynamic of incremental progress

- From nuclear to biological to chemical to biological
- CBW or CW & BW?
- Verification and the imposition of the military security imperative on civil society
- BTWC and a certain concept of disease

Disarmament / Non-proliferation paradigm shift

- Focus shift from weapon elimination to prevention of capability building
 - Impact on BTWC (Protocol) and CWC
 - Technology itself becomes central concern
- ‘Proliferation’ redefines the threat in function of the dominant power
 - Lack of consensus over threat evaluation
 - Lack of consensus over measures to address threat
 - Tendency to move to national rather than multilateral measures
- Objective goals vs. Subjective goals
 - Disarmament: goals specified in treaty and apply equally to all parties
 - Non-proliferation: Different approaches to different countries based on subjective judgment of intent
- Non-proliferation: BW threat can never disappear
 - Confirms the ‘shadow of the future’

Technology and verification

- What is technology?
 - Tangibles vs. Intangibles
- What is the concept of 'dual use'?
 - An intrinsic property of technology?
 - A property added through 'purpose'?
- Focus on 'purpose' rather than 'object': new scopes for verification procedures in BTWC
 - Focus especially on technology transfers
 - Equal responsibilities for importer and exporter
 - Create active responsibility of sub-state and transnational actors rather than make them 'victims' of inspections
 - Accreditation system with benefits for compliance
 - Monitor technology transfer patterns
 - Small international organization for these tasks with 'small' inspectorate to clarify anomalies or investigate compliance concerns (+ other functions)

The shadow of the future recast

- Current situation gives time to consider long-term implications of technology development and changes in the security environment on the BTWC
- Opportunity for a fundamental consideration of the future role of disarmament
- Opportunity to have fundamental debate on the role and functioning of verification, and to engage security actors other than states
- Absolute need to preserve cooperative security regime of the BTWC