

19. UNSCOM: activities in 1993

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I. Introduction

Under the terms of the 1991 Persian Gulf War cease-fire resolution,¹ the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) is mandated to identify and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile capability and to undertake 'ongoing' monitoring and verification of Iraq's obligation not to reacquire such capabilities. For nuclear weapons, UNSCOM assists and co-operates with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the implementation of this task. Previous chapters in *SIPRI Yearbooks* have reported on UNSCOM activities in 1991 and 1992;² this chapter charts developments from December 1992 to early 1994.³

The chapter also assesses the degree of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under section C of Security Council Resolution 687⁴ and the obstacles, mainly political, raised by Iraq. It records the political developments in 1993 from the confrontational stance taken by Iraq in the first half of 1993 to the more co-operative attitude adopted after a crisis in relations in July. The effect of these political developments on UNSCOM's ability to exercise its immunities, privileges and facilities, and hence to conduct its mandate effectively, is also discussed, as are the achievements of 1993 and the issues remaining to be addressed before UNSCOM can report to the Security Council that it has fulfilled its mandate.

II. Status of implementation as of December 1992

UNSCOM reported to the UN Security Council on 17 December 1992 that:

despite progress in many areas, no major breakthrough has been achieved which could make it possible to change the conclusion of the previous report to the Security Council. The most important developments have taken place in the areas of destruction of proscribed items and information on missile programmes and use. Neverthe-

¹ United Nations Security Council document S/RES/687 (1991), 3 Apr. 1991; for the text of the resolution, see SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1992), appendix 13A, pp. 525–30.

² Ekéus, R., 'The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq', *SIPRI Yearbook 1992* (note 1), pp. 509–30; Ekéus, R., 'The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq: activities in 1992', SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993), pp. 691–703.

³ In doing so, it draws heavily on the reports of the Executive Chairman to the Security Council, in particular the biennial reports for 1993 submitted in accordance with the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 699 (1991), 17 June 1991, contained in UN Security Council documents S/25977, 21 June 1993 and S/26910, 21 Dec. 1993.

⁴ See note 1.

less, much remains to be done. The main areas which require action before the Commission will be in a position to report to the Security Council that Iraq is in substantial compliance with its obligations are as follows:

- acceptance and implementation by Iraq of all the Commission's privileges and immunities, including ensuring the safety and security of UNSCOM personnel and property, the operation of and landing rights for UNSCOM aircraft and non-obstruction of the Commission's logistics and aerial surveillance flights;
- unconditional acknowledgement by Iraq of its obligations under Council resolutions 707 and 715 (1991);
- provision by Iraq of the documentation necessary to substantiate the data contained in its declarations and to provide the Commission with a full picture of its foreign procurement networks and suppliers;
- supplementation and revision of Iraq's declarations to the point where, in the view of the Commission, they constitute the full, final and complete disclosures required under resolution 707 (1991) and the initial declarations required under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification adopted by resolution 715 (1991);
- the initiation and smooth functioning of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq does not reacquire the weapons proscribed to it.⁵

Early 1993 found Iraq still refusing to acknowledge its obligations under Security Council Resolutions 707 and 715⁶ and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. Iraq maintained its earlier position on the plans approved under Resolution 715 for ongoing monitoring and verification, namely that both Resolution 715 and the plans were arbitrary, contrary to international law and such as to undermine the UN Charter.⁷

Iraq's disclosure of its proscribed weapon programmes fell short of the full, final and complete disclosure required by Resolution 707, and its initial declarations about its current dual-purpose capabilities (required by the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification)⁸ still contained major shortcomings which needed to be rectified if they were to form the basis for a definitive material balance of Iraq's past weapons of mass destruction programmes and for effective monitoring and verification of compliance. The information provided was tailored to what Iraqi authorities believed UNSCOM already knew,

⁵ 'Third status report on the activities of the Special Commission submitted by the Executive Chairman in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 699 (1991)', UN Security Council document S/24984, 17 Dec. 1992.

⁶ UN Security Council documents S/RES/707 (1991), 15 Aug. 1991 and S/RES/715 (1991), 11 Oct. 1991.

⁷ First stated in the letter of 19 Nov. 1991 from then Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Hussein, to the President of the Security Council. By letter, dated 28 Oct. 1992 from the Iraqi Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General. Iraq reiterated its opposition to Resolutions 707 and 715, by stating that: 'It is . . . essential for the Council to conduct a radical review, on the basis of justice and fairness, of the terms and provisions of these two resolutions'. In the statements to the Security Council on 23 Nov. (UN Security Council document S/PV.3139, Resumption 1) and 24 Nov. 1992 (UN Security Council document S/PV.3139, Resumption 2), Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tariq Aziz said: 'There is a need for all the measures and the provisions of the no longer necessary Security Council's resolutions to be drastically reviewed'.

⁸ The UNSCOM plan is contained in UN Security Council document S/22871/Rev.1, 2 Oct. 1991, and the IAEA plan is contained in UN Security Council documents S/22872/Rev.1, 20 Sep. 1991 and S/22872/Rev.1/Corr.1, 10 Oct. 1991. They were adopted under Security Council Resolution 715 on 11 Oct. 1991 and were intended to enter into force immediately upon adoption by the Security Council.

rather than constituting a frank and open disclosure. One set of declarations, concerning the legal and administrative actions taken by Iraq to give effect to its obligations arising from Resolutions 687 and 707 and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, had never been submitted. Furthermore, Iraq had refused to divulge information indicating the names of foreign companies from which it purchased equipment and materials. Accurate information on suppliers was essential for UNSCOM to establish a material balance for proscribed items and, with the IAEA and the Sanctions Committee, to devise a workable and realistic mechanism for export and import controls as required by paragraph 7 of Resolution 715.

Iraq also continued to fail to respect certain of UNSCOM's inspection rights either totally, as with the case of overflights of Baghdad, partially or intermittently. The concern was that in such circumstances UNSCOM could not be sure that it had accounted for all of Iraq's banned capabilities and could not ensure that Iraq would not reacquire such capabilities, especially after a possible lifting of the oil embargo or the sanctions. Consequently, UNSCOM's efforts in 1993 were dedicated largely to forcing Iraq to acknowledge the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification and to present better accounts of its past programmes and suppliers, supported by credible documentary evidence.

III. Political developments in 1993

Attempts in the first half of 1993 to elicit fuller information on chemical weapon (CW) and biological weapon (BW) issues met with unco-operative responses. Iraq denied ever using CW. It refused to turn over the missile-firing records that were essential if UNSCOM were to verify Iraqi claims to have accounted for all the Soviet-supplied Scud missiles. In addition, Iraq still refused to hand over data on its supplier network.

On 31 January 1993, the Iraqi Government officially informed the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM in writing⁹ that Iraq considered the new arrangement of interim monitoring (IMT1a/UNSCOM 48) at the Ibn Al Haytham Missile Research and Design Centre to be conducted under Resolution 687. UNSCOM understood this to mean that Iraq would prevent this inspection team, or any other team, from operating under the terms of the plan approved under Resolution 715. Iraq made similar statements in respect of subsequent interim monitoring activities¹⁰ (IMT1b/UNSCOM 54, IMT1c/UNSCOM 57) and

⁹ Correspondence between the Government of Iraq and the UN Special Commission.

¹⁰ On 1 Apr. 1993, when General Amer Mohammad Rashid al Ubeidi, Director of the Iraqi Military Industrialization Corporation, met the second interim monitoring team, reading from prepared notes and stressing that this was the official Iraqi position on the issue of monitoring, he is reported by the UN Chief Inspector to have said: 'Iraq accepted the first monitoring team to the Ibn Al Haytham Centre in accordance with resolution 687. However, it appears from the modalities of the monitoring team that the Special Commission is trying to overlap in a discreet fashion Iraqi obligations under resolution 687 and resolution 715. This is very clever. Iraq knows that, using Iraqi co-operation under resolution 687, the Special Commission wants to assert Iraqi obligations under resolution 715. Iraq is fully aware of this effort. If the objective of the Special Commission is to make sure that no prohibited activities are going on, prohibited items are destroyed and Iraq has no capability to reactivate proscribed programmes, Iraq has no objections as this is part of resolution 687. However, if the objective is to start a *de facto* imple-

maintained this position despite assurances by UNSCOM that if Iraq co-operated, its legitimate concerns would be met and UNSCOM's activities would be carried out in a manner which was not unduly intrusive.¹¹

On 14 February 1993, Iraq provided a second set of declarations entitled 'Updated Monitoring Information, Report No. 2'. These added little to the first set of such declarations provided in June 1992.

In the period April–June 1993 a problem arose as a result of Iraq's position on this key issue. It at first concerned the removal of certain precursor chemicals and production equipment from the Al Fallujah sites to Al Muthanna for destruction there. This rapidly became intertwined with two other issues: the installation of remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two rocket-engine test stands, and the issue of 'dialogue' between Iraq, on the one hand, and UNSCOM and the IAEA or the Security Council, on the other.

The fundamental underlying issue for Iraq was its desire to see an end to the first phase of implementation of its obligations under section C of Resolution 687—the identification and elimination of proscribed weapons and weapon programmes—and for this to be followed by implementation by the Security Council of paragraph 22 of the resolution (i.e., the lifting of the oil embargo) before proceeding to ongoing monitoring and verification activities). Iraq objected to the destruction of the chemicals and equipment on the grounds that they could be redeployed (despite their obvious and direct connection with the CW programme) and to the installation of the cameras on the grounds that this would constitute ongoing monitoring and verification under Resolution 715, a resolution which Iraq had not yet accepted and whose terms, according to Iraq,¹² were still the subject of discussion between Iraq and the Security Council. Instead, Iraq proposed that action on each of these items await the conclusion of a dialogue on all outstanding issues between it and UNSCOM and the IAEA.¹³ In fact, Iraq sought a dialogue in order to negotiate away its difficulties with ongoing monitoring and verification and to obtain early lifting of the oil embargo, whereas the resolutions and the plans made no provision for any negotiation of Iraq's obligations or UNSCOM's rights.

These developments led to the Security Council issuing a statement on 18 June 1993,¹⁴ demanding that Iraq accede to the removal and destruction of the chemicals and equipment in question and cease its obstruction of the installation of the cameras. Iraq acceded to the removal and destruction of the chemicals and equipment but continued to refuse to allow installation of the

mentation of resolution 715 without Special Commission testament to the Security Council that Iraq is in full compliance with resolution 687 and without implementing paragraph 22 of that resolution, Iraq will not welcome this mission. The monitoring missions would not be welcome. But, even in this case, Iraq will still co-operate with the Special Commission to see the true objectives of these missions and to explore the intentions of the Special Commission. Iraq told the Special Commission that resolution 715 could only be discussed in connection with the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687. You should never think or believe that it could be done otherwise.' UNSCOM internal reporting.

¹¹ First offered by the Special Commission in draft form to the Iraqi side during discussions held in New York in Mar. 1992.

¹² Official correspondence from the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated 8 June 1993.

¹³ Various letters from senior Iraqi Government officials to the UN Special Commission during the period 29 Apr. to 21 June 1993.

¹⁴ Circulated as UN Security Council document S/25970, 18 June 1993.

cameras. In order to resolve this impasse, the Executive Chairman visited Baghdad in July 1993. The result of this visit was a report¹⁵ which recorded UNSCOM and Iraqi position papers, UNSCOM's comments on Iraq's position paper and conclusions reflecting their common understanding.

In its paper, Iraq stated for the first time its readiness to comply with the provisions of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification as contained in Resolution 715. Both sides agreed to hold high-level technical talks in New York. One of the prime subjects would be the nature and implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification. All outstanding issues, including the activation of the cameras, were to be addressed. In the meantime, the cameras were to be installed, tested and maintained. UNSCOM would send inspectors to the two test sites as and when it wished, and Iraq would inform UNSCOM of each rocket test sufficiently in advance for UNSCOM to send personnel to observe the test.

The first round of high-level technical talks took place in New York from 31 August to 10 September 1993 and resulted in a joint report.¹⁶ This was the first time such a joint report had been submitted to the Security Council, indicating a greater degree of common ground than previously. During these talks, UNSCOM explained to Iraq precisely what ongoing monitoring and verification would entail and Iraq appeared to accept most of the methods planned to be used. Its prime concerns related to how the intrusive rights and privileges of UNSCOM, being extended indefinitely into the future, would be implemented so as not to endanger the safety of the Iraqi leadership, infringe on Iraq's sovereignty or hinder its economic or technical development. For UNSCOM and the IAEA, key questions were identified, the answers to which were necessary if they were ever to be in a position to conclude the identification phase of their operations. Most of these key questions related to foreign suppliers and technical advice although, in the CW area, some questions related to past production levels.

It was agreed at the end of the high-level technical talks to conduct a further round of high-level talks in Baghdad shortly thereafter in order to resolve all outstanding issues. Iraq promised, in this second round, to provide answers to all the questions identified but not answered during the New York talks. However, UNSCOM stipulated that there would be no second round unless the monitoring cameras were activated. Before this happened, an incident occurred when Iraq delayed the installation of gamma-detection sensors on board one of UNSCOM's helicopters. This dispute was quickly resolved upon the return of General Amer Mohammad Rashid al Ubeidi¹⁷ to Baghdad from the New York talks, but this delay resulted in the campaign of survey flights having to be reduced. Furthermore, Iraq did not agree immediately to the activation of the monitoring cameras—agreement was only forthcoming on 23 September 1993, activation taking place on 25 September 1993.

¹⁵ Circulated as UN Security Council document S/26127, 21 July 1993.

¹⁶ Circulated as UN Security Council document S/26451, 16 Sep. 1993.

¹⁷ Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation; see note 10.

The activation of the cameras and the conduct of the gamma-detection surveys permitted the second round of the high-level talks to proceed. A small advance team was sent to Baghdad on 27 September 1993 in order to elicit from the Iraqi side the responses to the questions identified in New York. While Iraq was immediately forthcoming on some of these, most answers were not given before the arrival of the Executive Chairman on 1 October as Iraq sought to place conditions on the handing over of the information (i.e., that UNSCOM should declare the information adequate before even seeing it).

After intensive discussions on all outstanding issues, Iraq provided answers to the key questions identified in New York. Iraq handed over a more detailed account of its past CW production and, for the first time, details on the suppliers of critical equipment or materials in each of the categories, including those who provided technical advice. Iraq's earlier accounts of its past CW production had blatantly failed to take into account past disposal of CW. In Baghdad, Iraq gave for the first time an account of CW production which addressed the obvious shortfalls of earlier declarations.

However, in exchange for this information, Iraq sought to have the information treated as solely confidential to UNSCOM and requested a statement from UNSCOM that Iraq was now fully in compliance with section C of Resolution 687 less the future monitoring aspects thereof. UNSCOM could not give this latter statement; it rather worded the report¹⁸ with caveats relating to adequate verification of the newly received information. The newly provided information needed to be verified, assessed and confirmed by UNSCOM staff in New York before UNSCOM could state that Iraq had discharged its obligation, in compliance with paragraphs 8 and 9(a) of Resolution 687, to provide the information necessary to constitute full, final and complete disclosures of its past programmes—an essential condition for the proper planning of ongoing monitoring and verification.

This did not fully satisfy Iraq, which still sought a definitive statement from UNSCOM and the IAEA to the effect that Iraq was now in full compliance with its obligations. In particular, it sought a statement that UNSCOM was fully satisfied with the newly provided data. In recognition that UNSCOM might need some time to study, verify and assess the new data, Iraq instead accepted a further round of talks in New York.

During this Baghdad round, Iraq also submitted to UNSCOM a further set of declarations in relation to ongoing monitoring and verification and declarations concerning sites that should be subject to baseline inspections under the monitoring regime (table 19.1 lists the inspections carried out in 1993). UNSCOM discussed these declarations with Iraq and how they could be improved to bring them in line with the requirements of the plan.¹⁹ UNSCOM also undertook, upon the delegation's return to New York, to create a standardized reporting format to facilitate Iraq's reporting and UNSCOM's use of

¹⁸ Circulated as UN Security Council document S/26571, 12 Oct. 1993.

¹⁹ UN Security Council document S/22871/Rev.1 (note 8).

Table 19.1. The 1993 UNSCOM inspection schedule, in-country dates

Type of inspection/date	Team
<i>Nuclear</i>	
22–27 Jan. 1993	IAEA17/UNSCOM 49
3–11 Mar. 1993	IAEA18/UNSCOM 52
30 Apr.–7 May 1993	IAEA19/UNSCOM 56
25–30 June 1993	IAEA20/UNSCOM 58
23–28 July 1993	IAEA21/UNSCOM 61
1–9 Nov. 1993	IAEA22/UNSCOM 64
<i>Chemical</i>	
18 June 1992–ongoing	CDG/UNSCOM 38
6–18 Apr. 1993	CW10/UNSCOM 55
27–30 June 1993	CW11/UNSCOM 59
19–22 Nov. 1993	CW12/UNSCOM 65
<i>Biological</i>	
11–18 Mar. 1993	BW3/UNSCOM 53
<i>Ballistic Missiles</i>	
25 Jan.–23 Mar. 1993	IMT1a/UNSCOM 48
12–21 Feb. 1993	BM15/UNSCOM 50
22–23 Feb. 1993	BM16/UNSCOM 51
27 Mar.–17 May 1993	IMT1b/UNSCOM 54
5–28 June 1993	IMT1c/UNSCOM 57
10–11 July 1993	BM17/UNSCOM 60
23 Aug.–27 Sep. 1993	BM18/UNSCOM 62
28 Sep.–1 Nov. 1993	BM19/UNSCOM 63
<i>Special Missions</i>	
12–18 Mar. 1993	
14–20 Mar. 1993	
19–24 Apr. 1993	
4 June–5 July 1993	
15–19 July 1993	
25 July–5 Aug. 1993	
9–12 Aug. 1993	
10–24 Sep. 1993	
27 Sep.–1 Oct. 1993	
1–8 Oct. 1993	
5 Oct. 1993–16 Feb. 1994	
2–10 Dec. 1993	
2–16 Dec. 1993	

Source: UN Security Council document S/26910, 21 Dec. 1993.

the data provided. However, UNSCOM informed Iraq that, as these declarations had not yet been made formally under Resolution 715, they could not be accepted by UNSCOM as fulfilment of Iraq's reporting obligations. Once Iraq acknowledged its obligations under Resolution 715 and the plans approved thereunder, Iraq would need to submit the required declarations formally under and in accordance with the resolution.

A further round of talks took place in New York on 15–30 November 1993, comprising high-level technical talks and, during the second week, parallel political talks.²⁰ In the technical talks UNSCOM informed Iraq that, at that stage, the information available in all areas had been deemed credible and that UNSCOM would deploy its best efforts to expedite the process of verifying the information with a view to arriving at a definitive conclusion. In subsequent working groups, Iraq provided information, supplementary to that provided in the previous round in Baghdad, on its past proscribed programmes and on sites, equipment and materials to be monitored pursuant to the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. Discussions were held on alternative means of verification, on a process to address past difficulties in verification and on how ongoing monitoring and verification would be implemented.

During the political talks the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, met the Executive Chairman and held consultations with members of the Security Council. Following these consultations, Iraq announced²¹ that the ‘Government of Iraq has decided to accept the obligations set forth in resolution 715 (1991) and to comply with the provisions of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification as contained therein’. In welcoming this development, UNSCOM requested that Iraq submit as soon as possible consolidated declarations under Resolution 715 and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. In response to this request, Iraq submitted to UNSCOM a statement²² confirming that previous Iraqi declarations were to be considered to have been made under Resolution 715 and its plans.

While this statement addressed the question of the legal status of Iraq’s earlier declarations, it did not address the problems arising from the declarations’ inadequacies, inadequacies that UNSCOM will have to take up with Iraq before it can fully implement its plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. UNSCOM’s current evaluation of Iraq’s declarations is that they are credible but still incomplete. The quantities for imports and production declared by Iraq are within UNSCOM’s estimate range. However, verification has been rendered difficult as Iraq claims that all relevant documentation about its past programmes has been destroyed. It is hoped that the alternative means of verification noted above will help overcome this problem.

UNSCOM received no declaration from Iraq concerning the legal and administrative measures it had taken to give effect to the relevant resolutions. These are clearly required before any determination is made that Iraq is in compliance with its reporting requirements.

In conclusion, in 1993 there were major positive developments at the political level. Iraq acknowledged its obligations under Resolution 715 and the plans approved thereunder. It stated that its earlier declarations in relation to future monitoring were made under and in conformity with Resolution 715

²⁰ A full report of this round is to be found in UN Security Council document S/26825, and Corr.1, 1 Dec. 1993.

²¹ Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the President of the Security Council, dated 26 Nov. 1993, UN Security Council document S/26811, annex, 26 Nov. 1993.

²² Enclosure II of UN Security Council document S/26825 (note 20).

and the plans, and it undertook to co-operate with UNSCOM in the implementation of the plans in order to arrive, at the earliest feasible time, at the stage where both UNSCOM and the IAEA will be in a position to report to the Security Council that Iraq is, in their view, meeting all the requirements of section C of Resolution 687.

IV. Immunities, privileges and facilities

In early 1993, UNSCOM encountered further problems with Iraq in the conduct of its mandate, particularly regarding the exercise of its immunities, privileges and facilities and the security of its personnel and property. At the start of a joint nuclear, chemical and biological documentation search in December 1992 (CBW3/UNSCOM 47, IAEA16/UNSCOM 47), Iraqis were observed leaving a site with documentation during an inspection and against the wishes of the inspectors. Also in December 1992, Iraq prevented UNSCOM from conducting an aerial inspection of two sites on the outskirts of Baghdad.²³ In January 1993, Iraq sought to deny UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to transport personnel and equipment into and from Iraq out of and to Bahrain.²⁴ In February 1993, Iraq threatened to shoot down a helicopter providing supporting overhead surveillance for an inspection team (BM16/UNSCOM 51) if the aircraft did not leave the vicinity of the site.²⁵

These events fitted into a general pattern of Iraqi conduct. Iraq, through its conduct in the latter part of 1992 and the early part of 1993, consistently demonstrated its desire to limit UNSCOM's inspection rights and operational capabilities through seeking to place restrictions on inspectors in the course of their work. While many of these Iraqi actions took place during the course of inspections under Resolution 687, there was no doubt that they formed part of a long-term campaign to establish a practice for the conduct of inspections which would severely restrict the rights provided in the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification and relevant Security Council resolutions. Iraq was clearly seeking to assert the right to interpret how the resolutions should be implemented.

In that campaign Iraq made attempts: to restrict the scope of inspections and information gathering; to restrict access and impose delays on inspections; to restrict the exercise of UNSCOM's aerial rights; to impose limits on the duration, size and composition of inspections; to require advance notice of inspection activities; and to limit the right to take photographs. The incidents varied in seriousness. Some might not have been significant had they not been part of a general trend. However, when taken together, these incidents added up to a major impediment which would have effectively impeded credible ongoing monitoring and verification. This attempt by Iraq to define the terms under which ongoing monitoring and verification would be conducted further under-

²³ Reported to the Security Council in UN Security Council document S/24984, 17 Dec. 1992.

²⁴ Reported in UN Security Council document S/25172*, 2 Mar. 1993.

²⁵ Reported in UN Security Council document S/25977 (note 3).

lined the need to obtain from Iraq its formal acknowledgement of its obligations under Resolution 715, so that there could be no doubt as to what was to be implemented and how.

However, after the visit of the Executive Chairman to Iraq in July 1993, the situation improved considerably. As noted above, in November 1993 Iraq accepted Resolution 715 and the plans approved thereunder. The most recent inspections, including the largest and most intensive yet conducted by UNSCOM (BM19/UNSCOM 63), have passed without incident and with Iraq extending all the facilities requested by the inspection teams. In December 1993 UNSCOM conducted gamma-radiation detection surveys, using equipment mounted on helicopters, over municipal Baghdad²⁶—one year after a similar mission to take aerial photographs was blocked by Iraq.²⁷ Indeed, Iraq has now assured UNSCOM²⁸ that it intends to assist it in any way possible to facilitate smooth implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification in order to arrive as soon as possible at the joint objective²⁹ held by UNSCOM and Iraq: to be in a position where UNSCOM and the IAEA can report in good conscience that Iraq has fulfilled the requirements set forth in paragraph 22 of Resolution 687 for the lifting of the oil embargo.

V. Operational developments

Chemical weapons

In the CW area, activities focused on destruction and were centred around two sites—Al Muthanna, the principal CW-production and storage site designated by UNSCOM as the prime site for destruction activities, and Muhammadiyat, a CW storage site west of Baghdad.

Operations at Muhammadiyat commenced on 21 February 1993 involving the transport of stable, filled munitions to Al Muthanna (21 250-gauge bombs and 9 DB0 cluster bombs) and on-site destruction of unstable munitions (101 250-gauge bombs and 5 500-gauge bombs). The quantities of unfilled munitions remaining at Muhammadiyat are: 5127 250-gauge bombs, 1094 DB2 cluster bombs and 58 DB0 cluster bombs.

At Al Muthanna an incinerator, built by Iraq to UNSCOM design specifications, became operational on 5 November 1992. It operates at temperatures in excess of 1100°C. During the third week of March 1993, a combustion-efficiency monitoring system was installed to monitor performance by continuously measuring concentrations of the combustion gases. Mustard gas is destroyed either by direct injection into the furnace or in a toluene/benzene/diesel mix. Some of the mustard gas has polymerized, complicating the process of extraction and destruction. By December 1993 all but a few 155-mm

²⁶ Reported in UN Security Council document S/26910 (note 3).

²⁷ Reported in UN Security Council document S/24984 (note 5).

²⁸ Private discussions.

²⁹ Reported in UN Security Council document S/26825 (note 20).

mustard gas-filled artillery shells had been destroyed. The remainder were in poor condition and will require an alternative means of destruction.

The neutralization of nerve agents by hydrolysis, also at Al Muthanna, continued. In early February 1993, hydrolysis of the bulk stocks of the nerve agent sarin (GB) was completed, followed shortly after by the completion of the explosive incineration of 122-mm sarin-filled rockets on 14 February 1993.³⁰ On 22 April the destruction of the remaining sarin from the Al Hussein (Scud) warheads was completed.³¹ A small amount of tabun (GA) remains to be destroyed.

Destruction of precursors, CW agents and munitions was to have been completed by March/April 1994. The provisional deadline for completing the tasks of the Chemical Destruction Group is set at mid-1994. Numbers of items destroyed at Al Muthanna, as of 6 December 1993, are listed in table 19.2 as absolute figures.³² However, there is some uncertainty as to the exact amounts of agent actually destroyed because of various factors such as leakage from containers and deterioration of agent prior to destruction.

In addition to the destruction activities noted above, five inspections conducted chemical activities, either as dedicated CW inspections or in conjunction with other tasks. One investigated allegations of CW use by the Iraqi Government against opposition forces in the Southern Marshes (CW12/UNSCOM 65). This inspection was constituted at short notice³³ to investigate persistent reports of such CW use. Initially, the team assembled as a fact-finding mission and visited Iran to clarify allegations from persons claiming to have witnessed the incident, specifically to obtain an exact location of the site at which the alleged CW attack took place. Upon obtaining this information, the team returned to Bahrain for further preparations³⁴ and entered Iraq on 19 November 1993.

The inspection team conducted a thorough inspection of the site and took a large number of soil, water, flora and fauna samples for laboratory analysis. The team also inspected the area around the site of the alleged attack. Vehicles, boats and helicopters were used in this survey. During the inspection the team did not find any immediate evidence of CW use. One unexploded munition was discovered at the site, but it was in too dangerous a condition for the team to take samples from it. Consequently, a second team of explosive demolition experts from UNSCOM's Chemical Destruction Group at Al Muthanna was dispatched to the site on 25 November 1993 and concluded that this munition was not a CW munition but a high-explosive rocket-propelled grenade. It was destroyed by these experts.

³⁰ Reported in 'United Nations Security Council oversees destruction of Iraqi rockets filled with nerve agent sarin', *United Nations Press Release*, no. IK/139, 24 Feb. 1993.

³¹ Reported in 'United Nations Security Council completes destruction of nerve agent sarin in Iraq: work continues', *United Nations Press Release*, no. IK/144, 22 Apr. 1993.

³² Internal UNSCOM reporting.

³³ Reported in 'Security Council investigating allegations of CW use by Iraq', *United Nations Press Release*, no. IK/156, 17 Nov. 1993.

³⁴ Reported in 'Security Council's team concludes on-site investigation of alleged CW use in Iraq', *United Nations Press Release*, no. IK/157, 22 Nov. 1993.

Table 19.2. Status of chemical destruction at Al Muthanna, as of 6 April 1994

Items	Quantity destroyed to date
<i>Munitions and sub-components</i>	
122-mm rocket and warhead	319
122-mm rocket warhead	6 454
122-mm rocket motor ^a	1 056
122-mm rocket propellant ^a	16 995
122-mm rocket motor tube ^a	11 239
155-mm projectile (empty)	12
155-mm projectile (mustard)	12 786
155-mm projectile (WP)	45
Al Hussein warhead (GB/GF)	16
Al Hussein warhead (empty)	13
R400 bomb	337
R400 tail fin assembly ^a	804
250-gauge bomb (oil filled)	5 176
250-gauge bomb (polymust, ^b partial)	713
250-gauge bomb (empty)	12
250-gauge bomb (WP)	8
500-gauge bomb (oil filled)	4
500-gauge bomb (polymust, ^b partial)	948
500-gauge bomb (GA, partial)	2
DB 2 bomb (unfilled)	1 115
DB 0 bomb (unfilled)	61
<i>CW agents (in litres)</i>	
Mustard gas	398 046
GA (tabun) nerve agent	21 365
GB/GF nerve agent	61 633
<i>Key precursors (in litres)</i>	
DF	14 600
D4	121 675
Thio-diethyleneglycol	153 980
Phosphorous oxychloride	344 800
Thionyl chloride	169 980
Phosphorous trichloride	415 000
<i>Immediate precursors (in litres)</i>	
Isopropyl alcohol	250 483
Cyclohexanol/isopropyl alcohol	5 200
Dichlorethane	4 120
Di-isopropylamine	30 000
Morpholine	10 000
Chlorobenzaldehyde	41 800
<i>Other chemicals (in litres)</i>	
Ethylchlorohydrine	1 900
Monoethyleneglycol	49 600
Malonnitrile	200
Ethanol	112 700

Items	Quantity destroyed to date
Thiololpolysulphide	60
Propanol 2	405
3-hydroxy 2-methyl piperdine	50
Hydrogen sulphide	160
Methanol	42 000
Toluene	10 800
Pyridine	19 000
<i>Other chemicals (in kilograms)</i>	
Dimethylamine-HCl	238 500
Sodium cyanide	180 000
Potassium cyanide	3000
KH fluoride	450 000
Sodium fluoride	135 000
Arsenic trioxide	1 850
HF	7 000
Mandelic acid	1 650
Triethanolamine	511
Methyldichloride	2 250
Glycolic acid	50
Diethylaminoethanol thiol HCL	10
2-ethylaminoethanol	180
Chloracetic acid	2 500
Dimethylamine	7 210
Methyl iodide	2 000
KF	600
CH ₃ ClOONa	250
AlCl ₃	2 800
KI	3 000
AsCl ₃	75
2, 4 dichlorophenol	2 250
Trichlorophenol	150
<i>Other</i>	
Bulk storage container (2 tonne)	32
White phosphorus (barrels)	648

^a Munition sub-component

^b Polymerized mustard agent

Source: Internal reporting from the Chemical Destruction Group to UNSCOM, New York.

In the course of this investigation, UNSCOM also obtained a number of documents, which were subjected to forensic examination. Analysis of these documents and the samples found no evidence to support the claims that CW had been used.³⁵

³⁵ Reported in 'No trace of chemical agent found in samples from southern Iraq', *United Nations Press Release*, no. IK/165, 28 Feb. 1994.

Another inspection (CW11/UNSCOM 59) was able to allay concerns that a bomb observed during inspection activities might have been developed for delivery of CW or BW. It was, in fact, a failed prototype for a CW bomb. In other inspection activities, considerable time was devoted to the development of an updated inventory of CW-production equipment at the Al Muthanna site, seminars were held with the Iraqi representatives to clarify gaps in Iraq's account of its past CW programme, reports of hidden CW caches were investigated and document searches were conducted. While no evidence of hidden CW was found, UNSCOM was unable to conclude a definitive material balance for the CW programme because Iraq continued to fail to provide full accounting for the precursors imported.

Biological weapons

Further BW inspections were also conducted. In addition to inspecting the bomb referred to above (CW11/UNSCOM 59), inspection activities assisted in identifying additional facilities to be included in the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification (BW3/UNSCOM 53). Recommendations were made on the form and nature of monitoring required at these sites. As with the CW issues, seminars were held with the Iraqi side to attempt to clarify details of Iraq's past BW programmes.

Ballistic missiles

Efforts related to ballistic missiles concentrated on three main aspects: trying to establish a definitive material balance for the Scud missiles supplied by the former Soviet Union; trying to account for Iraq's production capacity in the ballistic missile area; and establishing an interim monitoring regime for Iraq's dual-capable missile facilities. This last effort was necessary because of Iraq's refusal, noted above, until 26 November 1993 to acknowledge its obligations under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.

One inspection (BM15/UNSCOM 50) had as its main objectives to record serial numbers of specific machinery and to obtain raw materials for analysis to help determine the Iraqi supplier network and to assess the capabilities of certain establishments and facilities in Iraq including the Nasr [Victory] State Establishment, the Al Yawm Al Azim facility and the Technical Corps for Special Projects (TECO) test stand at Zaafaraniyah. It also supervised the destruction of the dies and moulds at Taji used or intended for use in proscribed missile activities.

A subsequent inspection (BM16/UNSCOM 51) checked specific information that items proscribed by Resolution 687 were present in an area west of Baghdad. The items were reported to be related to ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km and their associated vehicles. Three undeclared sites, suspected of concealing them, were thoroughly inspected at short notice—a large military ammunition production plant and two military units—

fully integrating helicopter and high-altitude surveillance aircraft with the ground inspection. No proscribed items or activities were observed by the inspection.

However, during the inspection a serious breach of UNSCOM's aerial-surveillance rights occurred. A helicopter was initially prevented from establishing aerial surveillance over one site. Iraqi officials employed repeated and open threats of force to impede the helicopter's mission. On one occasion, this threat was aggravated by Iraqi personnel aiming and training their anti-aircraft guns on the helicopter. These actions on the part of Iraq put UNSCOM personnel in real danger and constituted a gross violation of UNSCOM's rights and immunities. This serious incident was reported by the Executive Chairman to the Security Council on 24 February 1993.³⁶

An inspection on 28 September–1 November 1993 also investigated reports concerning suspect, prohibited activities in Iraq and the continued concealment of proscribed items, notably missiles, and verified information provided by Iraq on its past prohibited activities, especially on the operational use of missiles with a range greater than 150 km. This was the largest inspection to date (BM19/UNSCOM 63). In addition to previous inspection procedures, it required the use of new inspection techniques since much of the information to be checked by the team referred to underground storage for prohibited items. Ground-penetrating radar (GPR) mounted on helicopters was used to increase the effectiveness of the survey of areas to be inspected. The GPR was custom-designed to maximize its capability to detect prohibited items, especially missiles, missile launchers and possible 'hide sites'. Two additional helicopters were deployed to Iraq to support the inspection. The primary mission of these helicopters was to conduct GPR surveys. They also performed aerial inspection of specific sites and provided an additional means of securing sites to be inspected including, as necessary, at night using forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR).

During its deployment, this team inspected more than 30 sites and areas. Altogether, 28 GPR missions were flown, totalling more than 56 hours of flying time. No undeclared prohibited items or activities were identified.

Iraq's failure until 26 November 1993 to acknowledge its obligations under Resolution 715 was a major factor preventing the initiation of long-term monitoring by UNSCOM of Iraq's activities. In the meantime, Iraq was actively pursuing missile-related activities that are covered by the ongoing monitoring and verification plan, to include the establishment of a dedicated missile research and design centre north-west of Baghdad.

This facility, the Ibn Al Haytham Missile Research and Design Centre, was established by Iraq on 4 April 1992 as the main centre for research and design activity in Iraq involving ballistic missiles not prohibited by Resolution 687. This centre is not only involved in the maintenance of existing permitted missile systems, but also in the design of new missile systems, including the Ababil 100 with a range close to 150 km. The centre employs many of the

³⁶ Informal written report to members of the Security Council, not circulated as a public document.

scientists and technicians that were involved in the proscribed ballistic missile programmes prior to the Gulf War and adoption of Resolution 687.

In the absence of Iraq's acknowledgement of Resolution 715, interim monitoring (IMTa/UNSCOM 48) of the centre was initiated by UNSCOM to track Iraqi ballistic missile programmes to ensure that no proscribed activity was taking place. The focus of the first mission was liquid-propulsion systems and related technologies. Based upon the results of this mission, which in part highlighted the significant amount of continuing activity in Iraq in the field of solid propulsion, UNSCOM dispatched to Iraq a new team of interim monitors (IMT1b/UNSCOM 54), which continued the monitoring of the Ibn Al Haytham Centre and initiated interim monitoring of facilities associated with solid propulsion and related technologies. A third missile interim monitoring team (IMT1c/UNSCOM 57) assessed existing Iraqi capabilities in the area of precision machining related to ballistic missile production, in particular gyroscope devices and liquid-fuel engine manufacture.

These interim monitoring inspections provided the comprehensive technical assessments of current Iraqi missile programmes (including research, development and production capabilities) needed for planning and implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification activities in the missile area.

The final major activity in the area of missiles concerned the installation of remote-controlled camera monitoring systems at certain missile test stands in Iraq. On 6 June 1993, UNSCOM informed Iraq³⁷ of its intention to install remote-controlled camera systems at two missile-engine test stands, Al Yawm Al Azim and Al Rafah. The purpose of these cameras was to verify that no prohibited activities were taking place at these test stands. The camera system was designed to monitor activities continuously and to record all tests at those locations. Iraq responded that it would not accept any monitoring activities and would insist that UNSCOM limit itself to inspection activities under Resolution 687. On 18 June 1993, the President of the Security Council, on behalf of the Security Council, stated that Iraq must accept installation by UNSCOM of monitoring devices at the test stands (see section III above).

Even after this statement by the Security Council, Iraq continued its obstruction of the installation of the cameras. On 5 July 1993, after the initial installation team had spent over a month in Iraq awaiting a change in the Iraqi position which would allow the team to proceed with its mission, it was instructed by the Executive Chairman to withdraw. As an interim measure UNSCOM, after having informed the Security Council, dispatched a team to Iraq on 10 July 1993 (BM17/UNSCOM 60) to seal the relevant equipment and facilities at both sites so as to ensure that they were not used until the cameras had been installed. The Iraqi authorities blocked this team from carrying out its mission.

Pursuant to the arrangements agreed during the Executive Chairman's July 1993 visit to Iraq on the monitoring of missile tests, on 25 July 1993 UNSCOM dispatched a small technical team to Baghdad to install the camera

³⁷ Orally and by letter, during meetings in Baghdad.

systems at the Al Yawm Al Azim and Al Rafah sites. The installation and testing of the cameras were completed on 3 August 1993. As part of the interim arrangements, UNSCOM sent a number of missile experts to Baghdad to observe any missile tests that Iraq might declare to UNSCOM (BM18/UNSCOM 62). These experts also performed detailed engineering surveys of test facilities at Al Yawm Al Azim, Al Rafah and five other test stands capable of missile and rocket-engine tests.

After the first round of high-level talks in New York, the Government of Iraq informed UNSCOM that it had agreed to the activation of the camera systems at Al Rafah and Al Yawm Al Azim. On 25 September 1993, the cameras were activated. Since then they have operated on a continuous basis. The cameras are arranged in a manner that enables UNSCOM to assess whether a test was of a prohibited missile, engine or motor. In accordance with operating procedures established by UNSCOM, these camera systems provide constant coverage of the missile test stands at Al Rafah and Al Yawm Al Azim. Missile test monitoring handbooks, to include engineering baselines for the test sites, check-lists and reporting forms for the Iraqis, were developed. An upgrade of the camera systems to include radio links and improved lenses was undertaken from 2 to 10 December 1993.

Nuclear weapons

The IAEA, with the assistance and co-operation of UNSCOM, conducted a further six inspections in Iraq during the course of 1993. Activities focused on the removal and reprocessing of nuclear fuels, ensuring full accounting for Iraq's holdings of other nuclear materials, identification of installations, equipment and materials which need to be monitored, and sampling of Iraq's water courses as part of a monitoring regime designed to observe any activity at nuclear plants. In addition, the Special Commission, using prototype technology provided by the Government of France, conducted aerial surveys using gamma-radiation sensors mounted on UNSCOM helicopters. Furthermore, the IAEA held high-level discussions with Iraq to clarify certain outstanding issues relating to Iraq's past nuclear programme.

In the high-level discussions, Iraq provided information on foreign technical advice received in relation to centrifuge enrichment of uranium and on the procurement of equipment and materials, in particular maraging steel, from foreign sources.

The IAEA reported that the fresh fuel for the IRT 5000 reactor has been transferred to Russia and transformed, through isotopic dilution, into uranium enriched to slightly less than 20 per cent U-235.³⁸ This material is now in a storage facility in Russia under IAEA safeguards pending its resale. The French material testing reactor (MTR) type plates and the Russian-origin fuel pins removed from Iraq in June 1992 remain in storage at the IAEA Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. The irradiated fuel was removed from Iraq in two

³⁸ UN Security Council documents S/25983, 21 June 1993 and S/26897, 20 Dec. 1993.

shipments by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and a US subcontractor, under close IAEA supervision. The subcontractor supplied casks capable of withstanding an aeroplane crash into which the fuel was repackaged for shipment. The material was flown out of Iraq in an Antonov-124 directly to Yekaterinburg in the Russian Federation from where it will be transferred to Chelyabinsk for reprocessing. After dilution, the residual materials will be available for resale under the supervision of the IAEA for use in peaceful nuclear activities.

Most of the remaining slurries containing natural uranium from the Al Jezira site have been recovered—some 59 drums—and has been transferred to a storage site at location C at Al Tuwaitha, under IAEA supervision.

While the IAEA reports that the nuclear materials subject to safeguards inspection prior to the Gulf War have long since been accounted for, it also reports that efforts to confirm independently the quantities of nuclear material not subject to safeguards inspection have not been completely successful. Considerable effort has been expended to develop an internally consistent picture of how the nuclear materials from different origins had been used. However, the IAEA is not yet confident that all nuclear materials have been declared and presented.

Concerning dual-purpose items to be monitored, Iraq provided the IAEA at the end of January 1993 with a revised list of items subject to ongoing monitoring and verification which existed or had existed since 1 January 1989 in Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) facilities, universities and state establishments which supported the IAEC programme. However, Iraq indicated that some items might have been omitted from the list, either through oversight or because they were not thought to be covered by Annex 3 of the IAEA plan for ongoing monitoring and verification³⁹ and that future declarations might include additional items. A further set of declarations was received in the autumn of 1993, the accuracy and completeness of which are being verified by the IAEA.

The first special Aerial Inspection Team (AIT) mission which focused on detection of gamma emissions was flown on 10–25 September 1993. Owing to some early obstruction on the part of Iraq, flights did not begin until 15 September and, consequently, the coverage of the mission was considerably reduced. Partial surveys were conducted at Al Tuwaitha, Al Atheer and Al Jezira. Gamma signals were detected from multiple points at all sites. Preliminary analysis indicates the usefulness of this technique in identifying specific locations warranting more detailed ground inspections. Use will be made of this gamma-detection capability in the future.

The second such aerial inspection using the gamma-detection equipment was flown on 2–15 December 1993. During this mission more extensive coverage of previously covered sites was accomplished and additional sites surveyed.

³⁹ Contained in UN Security Council document S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1 (note 8).

Aerial surveillance

Aerial-surveillance activities continued using both U-2 aircraft (a total of 186 missions flown as of 10 December 1993) and helicopter platforms (335 target missions now flown). Helicopter missions continue to be flown in support of ground inspections and to provide a time-series photographic record of sites which need monitoring under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. Additional sensors (gamma-detection, FLIR and GPR) have been mounted on to the helicopters for specific missions to give them greater monitoring and detection capability. The gamma-detection sensors and the GPR required the helicopters to operate in a new mode—one of survey. The object of gamma detection is to map background radiation levels as a reference against which to judge future gamma surveys and to identify any unusual sources of radiation which might require immediate investigation. The object of the GPR is to search for underground chambers or hidden items. Such missions have been flown in and around Baghdad and in central, western and north-western Iraq. Iraq has withdrawn its previous objections to flights within the area which it had claimed to constitute the limits of Baghdad.

VI. Issues and priorities for the future

UNSCOM will be able to report to the Security Council that Iraq is in substantial compliance with its obligations and that the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq does not reacquire the weapons proscribed to it have been initiated and are smoothly functioning only when Iraq fulfils certain obligations. Iraq must supplement and revise its declarations to the point where, in the view of UNSCOM, they conform with the full, final and complete disclosures required under Resolution 707 and of initial declarations required under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. In regard to the former, supplementation by supporting documentary evidence clearly provides the most satisfactory solution. However, UNSCOM has discussed with Iraq alternative means whereby it might assist UNSCOM in verifying adequately its various declarations.

Iraq will also need to establish a track record of accepting and co-operating in the implementation of all aspects of the plans, including compliance with UNSCOM's privileges and immunities as required for effective and efficient monitoring and verification, ensuring the safety and security of personnel and property, landing rights for aircraft and non-obstruction of inspections and logistics.

On the basis of Iraq's revised declarations, UNSCOM must draw up a list of sites which should be subject to baseline inspections to assess how each site should be monitored and with what frequency. For each site a monitoring and verification protocol will need to be compiled, containing the information on the site essential for effective monitoring and the details of the monitoring and verification activities to be conducted at the site in question. Once these have been prepared in draft, baseline inspections can proceed and final drafts of the

protocols can be submitted by the inspection teams to the Executive Chairman for approval.

In addition, UNSCOM, the IAEA and the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Resolution 661⁴⁰ are required, in accordance with paragraph 7 of Resolution 715, to develop a mechanism for monitoring any future sales of supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to section C of Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions, including Resolution 715 and the plans approved thereunder.

Further activities are planned in each of the weapon categories. Destruction activities currently focus on CW, CW precursors and CW-production equipment at Al Muthanna. Preparations for the implementation of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification are under way and proposals for the potential form of an export/import control regime after the lifting of sanctions have been discussed. There will be a shift of emphasis towards: verifying definitively Iraq's accounts of its past programmes and its supplier networks; preparations for and operations under ongoing monitoring and verification; and further elaboration of the proposals for import and export monitoring.

The priorities for UNSCOM are now: (a) verification and supplementation of Iraq's declarations at a level acceptable to UNSCOM; (b) the initiation of monitoring inspections; (c) drafting a mechanism for export/import monitoring; (d) the establishment of practice and precedent in the exercise of UNSCOM's privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for effective and efficient implementation of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification; and (e) completion of the destruction activities related to Iraq's former CW programme at Al Muthanna.

⁴⁰ UN Security Council document S/RES/661 (1990), 6 Aug. 1990.