

13. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq: activities in 1992

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I. Introduction

The implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687¹ which established the cease-fire after the 1991 Persian Gulf War continued in 1992 with the same intensity as in 1991.² Under the cease-fire resolution all weapons of mass destruction in Iraq should be declared, identified, located and disposed of and a monitoring system to ensure that no new weapons be reintroduced to Iraq was to be established. The prohibited weapons are nuclear weapons, biological weapons (BW), chemical weapons (CW) and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km. Furthermore, in October 1991 UN Security Council Resolution 715 approved two plans, one for nuclear items and one for non-nuclear items, for monitoring Iraqi compliance with the obligations under the cease-fire regime not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the prohibited weapons.³

It should be recalled that in provisions of the cease-fire resolution, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was established as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council to carry out the tasks of supervising and executing the elimination of Iraq's BW, CW and ballistic missile capabilities and of monitoring Iraq's compliance. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was requested to carry out the corresponding tasks regarding Iraq's nuclear capability with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission.

For chemical weapons, in 1992 there was a shift of emphasis and resources towards destruction activities. While inspection of both declared and undeclared sites continued, UNSCOM teams supervised the destruction of chemical ammunition and the completion of construction of two chemical destruction facilities. The facilities—one a hydrolysis plant for the destruction of nerve agent and the other an incinerator for mustard gas—were commissioned in late 1992 and early 1993, respectively, and are operating at full capacity.

In 1992 missile inspections intensified and diversified. Traditional weapon searches, document and computer investigation, and highly specialized inspections focusing on components, fuel and production elements were carried out with the aim of establishing whether all of Iraq's missiles and related capabil-

¹ United Nations Security Council document S/RES/687 (1991), 8 Apr. 1991; for the text of the resolution, see SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1992), appendix 13A, pp. 525–30.

² See 'The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq', *SIPRI Yearbook 1992* (note 1), pp. 509–24.

³ United Nations Security Council document S/RES/715 (1991), 11 Oct. 1991.

ities have been accounted for as Iraq states.⁴ A number of production facilities and equipment were destroyed in the early months of 1992, and tangible progress was made in obtaining information from Iraq about its operational use of missiles.

While doubt continues to be expressed about the completeness of Iraq's declarations concerning its BW programme, there was little development in this area in 1992. Inspections continued with only limited concrete results.

As of February 1993 the IAEA has carried out a total of 17 nuclear inspections with the assistance and co-operation of UNSCOM. These have entailed inspections at more than 70 sites. The results of these activities during 1992 and early 1993 have given good insight into and understanding of Iraq's nuclear programme. The conclusion arrived at is that the nuclear programme was intended to produce enriched uranium and to develop a nuclear weapon capability.

II. Iraqi non-compliance

Owing to consistent refusal by Iraq to accept the initiation and practical implementation of Resolution 715 for compliance monitoring, on 19 February 1992 the Security Council declared that Iraq was in material breach of the cease-fire resolution and dispatched to Iraq a high-level mission led by the Chairman of UNSCOM, armed with a statement demanding that Iraq give the necessary assurances of compliance with the Security Council resolutions or face serious consequences. The mission visited Iraq from 21 to 24 February. In its report to the Security Council,⁵ it concluded that unconditional compliance by Iraq had not been provided and that therefore the implementation of Resolution 715 could not be initiated. Partly coinciding with the mission, Iraq refused to permit the start of the destruction of the facilities and equipment associated with its missile production programme. The Security Council, having received the report, condemned Iraq's failure to comply with its obligations to accept the destruction as required and to make the necessary declarations under Resolution 715. In response the Government of Iraq requested that it be allowed to present its views directly to the Security Council.

During the debate on 11 and 12 March in the Security Council at which Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister presented the position of the Iraqi Government, the President of the Security Council, speaking on behalf of all members of the Security Council, stated that the Government of Iraq must immediately take steps to comply fully and unconditionally with its obligations under the relevant resolutions.⁶ Following the debate, teams of ballistic missile experts from the Special Commission visited Iraq in March and April and supervised the destruction of 10 large buildings for the production of ballistic missiles and of a large amount of equipment for missile production. These events

⁴ United Nations Security Council document S/PV.3139 (Resumption 1).

⁵ United Nations Security Council document S/23643, 26 Feb. 1992.

⁶ United Nations Security Council documents S/PV.3059, S/PV.3059 (resumption 1), and S/PV.3059 (Resumption 2).

concluded a period of confrontation between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations on the question of whether items other than proscribed weapons were to be destroyed under the cease-fire regime. After this development, uncontested destruction took place of key technical installations comprising buildings and equipment at the nuclear weapon development complex at Al Atheer–Al Haytham, including 8 large buildings.

A major political problem developed on 5 July when Iraq refused an inspection team access to the Ministry of Agriculture. UNSCOM had reliable information from two sources that the building contained archives related to proscribed activities. These archives were of relevance to the work of the Special Commission and their retention by Iraq was also prohibited. The Government of Iraq claimed that UNSCOM had no right to enter the building as it contained nothing of relevance to the weapon systems proscribed under Resolution 687 and that to allow access would be to undermine Iraq's sovereignty and national security. The Special Commission established round-the-clock surveillance of the building by members of the UNSCOM inspection team. The Security Council issued a statement on 6 July declaring that Iraq's refusal to permit the inspection team entry to the Ministry of Agriculture constituted a material breach of the provisions of the cease-fire resolution.⁷ Despite this, Iraq continued in its refusal. At the request of the Security Council, the Chairman of the Special Commission visited Baghdad on 17–19 July. Talks with the Iraqi authorities—the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs—did not resolve the situation, as reported to the Security Council on 20 July by the Chairman of the Special Commission. UNSCOM surveillance of the Ministry of Agriculture had to be terminated on 22 July when an escalation of violence against the UNSCOM inspectorate in Baghdad culminated in an attempt to kill UNSCOM inspectors guarding the building.

Against the background of continued demonstration, violence and threats directed at the UNSCOM inspection team in Baghdad and growing impatience among Security Council members, intensive talks took place on 24–26 July in New York between the Chairman of the Special Commission and the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations. Agreement was reached on 26 July and the inspection of the building was finally carried out on 28 July, parallel with new talks in Baghdad between the Chairman of the Special Commission and the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister. No items relevant to Security Council resolutions were found in the Ministry of Agriculture building which had stood unguarded by UNSCOM inspectors for six days. The solution to this crisis, which at times nearly led to military action, established to the satisfaction of the Special Commission its unequivocal right to enter any site or building in Iraq, without exception.

In the month that followed, tension remained high as some Iraqi officials made statements that ministry buildings and other installations of similar significance were off-limits to UNSCOM. However, the strain gradually subsided as the matter was not raised by the Iraqi Cabinet members directly

⁷ United Nations Security Council document S/24240, 6 July 1992.

responsible. The Chairman of the Special Commission reiterated the policy that UNSCOM would continue its inspection activities in Iraq with due regard to Iraq's legitimate concern for its dignity and sovereignty. The principle of unrestricted access was upheld through a subsequent inspection carried out on 22 October without major difficulty.

After the Ministry of Agriculture stand-off, a campaign of harassment, threat and physical attack against UNSCOM personnel in Baghdad continued, albeit at a lower level of intensity. It was clear from the nature of the campaign that it was centrally co-ordinated and not, as Iraqi authorities insisted, a spontaneous outburst of public indignation. Security for UNSCOM personnel has improved or worsened in a pattern conveniently corresponding to the political needs of the authorities.

III. UNSCOM surveillance activities

Following a 9 April letter in which Iraq called for a halt to all of the Special Commission's high-altitude U-2 aerial surveillance flights and warned that their continuation would endanger the aircraft and its pilot, the Security Council held consultations, after which the President issued a statement on behalf of its members⁸ in which it was pointed out that the 'surveillance flights are carried out under the authority of Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)' and that the right of UNSCOM to conduct such flights was reaffirmed. The Security Council called upon the Government of Iraq to give assurances on the security and safety of the flights and warned of various consequences if Iraq did not comply with its obligations in this regard. In a 12 April letter to the Security Council, the Foreign Minister of Iraq affirmed that the Government of Iraq 'did not intend and does not intend to carry out any military operation aimed at the Commission's aerial surveillance flights'.⁹

During 1992 aerial surveillance activities intensified. The regular flights of the high-altitude U-2 aircraft—flying approximately three times per week—were supplemented by aerial inspections conducted from UNSCOM helicopters based at Rasheed Airbase in the Baghdad area. The helicopter inspections commenced on 21 June and were carried out to supplement the high-altitude photography surveillance in the planning of inspections, monitoring of sites, preparation of inspection teams and identification of inspection targets. These operations were added to the original task of the helicopters—the rapid transport of inspection teams to sites supposed to contain time-sensitive data. The combination of high-altitude surveillance operations and helicopter aerial inspection has proven effective as the former offers the advantages of longer flight time, wider surveillance coverage and maintaining uncertainty of the exact sites which are being photographed, while the latter offers better oblique photography, higher resolution, 360° video coverage and faster response time.

⁸ United Nations Security Council document S/23803, 10 Apr. 1992.

⁹ United Nations Security Council document S/23806, 13 Apr. 1992.

From initiation of this new surveillance procedure, Iraq embarked upon a campaign to achieve an early end to the helicopter operations by placing limits on the way the helicopters might be used. It thus claimed limits with regard to so-called sensitive sites, tried to designate narrow flight patterns and routes, and accepted the use of helicopter surveillance only for well-defined sites, rather than for area or route surveys.

In September, upon imposition by the Persian Gulf War Coalition of the no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel, Iraq sought to prevent UNSCOM from flying its C-160 fixed-wing aircraft from Bahrain across the no-fly zone and suggested that the aircraft cross into Iraqi airspace above the 32nd parallel. UNSCOM rejected this idea because it constituted an infringement of its rights and would in the long run be operationally impracticable given that the C-160 aircraft's base was in Bahrain. UNSCOM continued using the short route through the no-fly zone.

At the end of 1992 the Iraqi Government refused to let UNSCOM utilize helicopter surveillance over Baghdad. Although the Special Commission has itself decided not to route flights over central Baghdad, important operational needs require that flights be made over the large military and industrial areas on the outskirts of the city. The Special Commission has pointed out that Security Council Resolution 707 explicitly sanctions the use by UNSCOM of fixed- or rotary-wing aerial surveillance over all Iraqi territory.¹⁰ This matter is still unresolved.

A serious development occurred on 7 January 1993 when the Government of Iraq informed the Special Commission that it would no longer be permitted to land its aircraft in Iraq.¹¹ Instead Iraq offered the use of either Iraqi aircraft or the overland route from Amman, Jordan, for the transport of UNSCOM personnel and equipment. This was reported by the Special Commission to the Security Council which dealt with the matter in conjunction with a number of other problems in relation to Iraq. In a 8 January 1993 statement,¹² the Security Council demanded that Iraq permit UNSCOM to use its own aircraft in Iraq. The statement noted that the restrictions placed on UNSCOM flights constituted an unacceptable and material breach of the relevant provisions of Security Council Resolution 687 and contained a warning to Iraq about the serious consequences which would ensue from failure to comply with its obligations. Upon the statement by the Security Council, the Special Commission on 9 January 1993 notified Iraq of the intended flights of the UNSCOM C-160 for the following days. In a letter to the President of the Security Council on the same day, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs reiterated Iraq's position.¹³

On 11 January in a Presidential Statement the Security Council demanded that Iraq co-operate fully with UNSCOM and warned Iraq of the serious con-

¹⁰ United Nations Security Council document S/RES/707 (1991), 15 Aug. 1991.

¹¹ United Nations Security Council document S/25172, 29 Jan. 1993, p. 3.

¹² United Nations Security Council document S/25081, 8 Jan. 1993.

¹³ United Nations Security Council document S/25086, 10 Jan. 1993.

sequences that would attend continued defiance.¹⁴ On 13 January Iraq's Foreign Minister again refused to allow flights under the normal procedures, stating that flights would be accepted on a case-by-case basis but that Iraq could bear no responsibility for the safety of UNSCOM aircraft.¹⁵ On 14 January the Special Commission delivered a new note to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry containing notification of flight plans for the UNSCOM C-160 aircraft for the coming days.¹⁶ In a 15 January note from the Foreign Ministry Iraq reiterated that it would not be responsible for the safety of UNSCOM flights, and extended this condition to cover any confusion or error on the part of Iraq.¹⁷

The Chairman of the Special Commission informed the President of the Security Council on 16 January that the response by the Government of Iraq constituted a refusal on the part of Iraq of UNSCOM's notification because it abdicated Iraq's responsibility for ensuring the security and safety of UNSCOM personnel.¹⁸ However, the Special Commission made further efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement by providing Iraq with a new set of flight notifications to be acknowledged in accordance with Iraq's obligations. Later the same day, Iraq rejected the request for ensuring the safety and security of the notified flights. Guarantees to this effect would only be given if the UNSCOM aircraft entered Iraqi airspace from Jordanian airspace. The Special Commission responded the same evening by stating that it could not carry out its operations using the route indicated by Iraq and that it intended to fly the direct route between its base in Bahrain and Baghdad (Habbaniyah Airfield).¹⁹ Iraq was also notified accordingly. The following day (17 January) Iraq expressed its readiness to guarantee the safety of the flights provided the Special Commission in its turn would guarantee that Coalition aircraft (i.e., those of France, the UK and the USA) did not fly in Iraqi airspace while UNSCOM's aircraft were in the air. In a response the same day, the Special Commission stated that it was not in a position to provide the guarantees requested by Iraq.²⁰

This development took place against the background of a tense situation between Iraq and the members of the Coalition. Thus on 13 January some member states of the Coalition carried out air attacks against military targets in Iraq. On 15–17 January, the military pressure on Iraq escalated until the United States on 17 January carried out an attack with cruise missiles on a major industrial installation on the outskirts of Baghdad. This installation is well-known to both the IAEA and UNSCOM as it has been subject to detailed inspection both by nuclear and missile expert teams.

¹⁴ United Nations Security Council document S/25091, 11 Jan. 1993.

¹⁵ See note 11, p. 4.

¹⁶ See note 11, pp. 4, 9.

¹⁷ See note 11, p. 4.

¹⁸ See note 11, pp. 4, 10–11.

¹⁹ See note 11, pp. 4, 13.

²⁰ See note 11, p. 14.

On 19 January, Iraq informed the Special Commission that it would allow the resumption of UNSCOM flights in accordance with established procedure and with the necessary guarantees to ensure the safety of the aircraft.²¹

It can be seen from the above that the crisis concerning the flights of the UNSCOM aircraft was brought about by Iraq's initial refusal on 7 January 1993 not to permit the use of C-160s to transport UNSCOM personnel and equipment into Iraq and the continuing and insistent obstruction despite repeated opportunities to modify its position. This was a breach of Iraq's obligations under Security Council Resolutions 687, 707 and 715—all adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.²²

IV. UNSCOM inspection activities

Nuclear weapons

Considering that Iraq's initial declaration in May 1991²³ under Resolution 687 stated that it had no nuclear weapons, no nuclear weapon programme, no weapon grade materials, no knowledge of or activity related to nuclear weapon subsystems, components or manufacture, and no research and development (R&D) facilities related to the production of nuclear weapons, it is quite remarkable that one and a half years after this declaration it is now proven that—with the exception of nuclear weapons—Iraq had all of the above.

All of the fresh fuel for Iraq's Russian research reactor has been transferred to Russia and transformed into enriched uranium to slightly less than 20 per cent in uranium-235. The material is stored under IAEA safeguards in a facility in Russia pending its resale. The IAEA is in the process of finding the ways and means for the removal and transportation from Iraq, and final disposal outside Iraq, of irradiated fuel under seal and verification by the IAEA. The IAEA has reported that all fuel assemblies now are accessible and can be removed without major technical difficulties. The IAEA continues to pursue its inquiry into inconsistencies in the nuclear material flow declarations. As mentioned above, the IAEA has carried out large-scale destruction of R&D facilities at Al Atheer. Furthermore, at Tarmiya the IAEA has destroyed all of the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) production buildings and associated electrical-power distribution capability. Also at other EMIS-related facilities, relevant capabilities have been eliminated. Table 13.1 below lists the nuclear and other UNSCOM inspections which have been carried out as of 31 December 1992.

The IAEA considers that it is now able to draw a reasonably coherent and consistent picture of Iraq's nuclear programme, even if doubts remain as to

²¹ See note 11, p. 5.

²² See 'Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter', SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1991), appendix 18B, pp. 636–37.

²³ United Nations Security Council document S/22614, 17 May 1991.

Table 13.1. The UNSCOM inspection schedule, as of 31 December 1992

Date and type of inspection	Team
<i>Nuclear</i>	
15–21 May 1991	IAEA1/UNSCOM1
22 June–3 July 1991	IAEA2/UNSCOM4
7–18 July 1991	IAEA3/UNSCOM5
27 July–10 Aug. 1991	IAEA4/UNSCOM6
14–20 Sep. 1991	IAEA5/UNSCOM14
21–30 Sep. 1991	IAEA6/UNSCOM16
11–22 Oct. 1991	IAEA7/UNSCOM19
11–18 Nov. 1991	IAEA8/UNSCOM22
11–14 Jan. 1992	IAEA9/UNSCOM25
5–13 Feb. 1992	IAEA10/UNSCOM27+30
7–15 Apr. 1992	IAEA11/UNSCOM33
26 May–4 June 1992	IAEA12/UNSCOM37
14–21 July 1992	IAEA13/UNSCOM41
31 Aug.–7 Sep. 1992	IAEA14/UNSCOM43
8–19 Nov. 1992	IAEA15/UNSCOM46
6–14 Dec. 1992	IAEA16/UNSCOM47
<i>Chemical</i>	
9–15 June 1991	CW1/UNSCOM2
15–22 Aug. 1991	CW2/UNSCOM9
31 Aug.–8 Sep. 1991	CW3/UNSCOM11
31 Aug.–5 Sep. 1991	CW4/UNSCOM12
6 Oct.–9 Nov. 1991	CW5/UNSCOM17
22 Oct.–2 Nov. 1991	CW6/UNSCOM20
18 Nov.–1 Dec. 1991	CBW1/UNSCOM21
27 Jan.–5 Feb. 1992	CW7/UNSCOM26
15–29 Apr. 1992	CW8/UNSCOM35
21–29 Sep. 1992	CW9/UNSCOM44
26 June–10 July 1992	CBW2/UNSCOM39
6–14 Dec. 1992	CBW3/UNSCOM47
21 Feb.–24 Mar. 1992	CD1/UNSCOM29
5–13 Apr. 1992	CD2/UNSCOM32
18 June 1992–ongoing	CDG/UNSCOM38
<i>Biological</i>	
2–8 Aug. 1991	BW1/UNSCOM7
20 Sep.–3 Oct. 1991	BW2/UNSCOM15
<i>Ballistic missile</i>	
30 June–7 July 1991	BM1/UNSCOM3
18–20 July 1991	BM2/UNSCOM10
8–15 Aug. 1991	BM3/UNSCOM8
6–13 Sep. 1991	BM4/UNSCOM13
1–9 Oct. 1991	BM5/UNSCOM18
1–9 Dec. 1991	BM6/UNSCOM23
9–17 Dec. 1991	BM7/UNSCOM24
21–29 Feb. 1992	BM8/UNSCOM28
21–29 Mar. 1992	BM9/UNSCOM31
13–21 Apr. 1992	BM10/UNSCOM34

Date and type of inspection	Team
14–22 May 1992	BM11/UNSCOM36
11–29 July 1992	BM12/UNSCOM40A+B
7–18 Aug. 1992	BM13/UNSCOM42
16–30 Oct. 1992	BM14/UNSCOM45
<i>Special missions</i>	
30 June–3 July 1991	..
11–14 Aug. 1991	..
4–6 Oct. 1991	..
11–15 Nov. 1991	..
27–30 Jan. 1992	..
21–24 Feb. 1992	..
17–19 July 1992	..
28–29 July 1992	..
6–12 Sep. 1992	..
4–9 Nov. 1992	..

Source: United Nations Security Council document S/24984, 17 Dec. 1992.

whether the picture is complete. Furthermore, during the period under review efforts to implement the provisions of the cease-fire resolution with regard to destruction, removal and the rendering harmless of all nuclear-related prohibited items have continued, largely successfully. Thus, key buildings and equipment have been demolished under the supervision of the IAEA inspection teams at the Al Atheer, Tarmiya and Al Sharqat sites. All currently known nuclear-weapon-usable material has been verified and is being kept under seal awaiting removal from Iraq. In addition, numerous other materials, equipment and components have been either destroyed, removed from Iraq or placed under seal.

Ballistic missiles

Iraq's initial declarations of its ballistic missile programme included incorrect numbers for its missile holdings, launchers and some support equipment. The original declarations did not contain information about such important elements of the programme as major missile parts, test, decoy and training missiles and launchers, and production, testing and repair equipment and facilities.

In late March Iraq declared a large number of ballistic missiles, not earlier accounted for, along with certain associated equipment. This information, which meant that the assessed number of destroyed missiles had to be radically revised upwards, signified something of a change in the previously uncooperative and confrontational posture of Iraq.

Upon learning in March 1992 that UNSCOM had photographic proof that its declarations were false, Iraq increased from 52 to 144 its declaration of the Scud missiles and Scud variants held at the end of the war. All the missiles

thus accounted for have been destroyed by Iraq either under the supervision of UNSCOM or secretly without international control. In subsequent inspections UNSCOM has been able to verify that the destruction of all identified missiles has indeed been carried out. The number of declared fixed launchers has increased over time from 30 to 53, of mobile launchers from 10 to 19, of conventional missile warheads from 23 to 113, and of chemical missile warheads from 30 to 75.

In 1992 UNSCOM inspections and analytical activities increasingly concentrated on production capabilities such as reverse engineering and modification of Scud missiles by extending the range and rocket fuel capabilities. This has radically improved UNSCOM's understanding of the ballistic missile programme. Several inspections included seminar-type meetings with Iraq's weapon experts in order to resolve complicated questions arising from inspection activities. During this process the Special Commission obtained detailed information relating to the scope and extent of programmes to acquire or produce prohibited ballistic missiles and components, including data on previously undisclosed projects for computer support and missile fuel production. No evidence was found that Iraq had the capability indigenously to produce fuel for prohibited ballistic missiles. The interrelationship between the various projects in the ballistic missile programme and the involvement of different organizations in the programme has been mapped out. Despite Iraq's resistance, important information on foreign involvement in certain aspects of the programme was acquired.

Chemical weapons

Gradually during 1992 Iraq admitted possession of additional chemical weapons. Thus Iraq's possession of chemicals at the end of the Persian Gulf War amounted to 150 000 filled and unfilled munitions, 300 tonnes of bulk agent and 3000 tonnes of precursor chemicals. The agents which Iraq possessed were mustard gas agent, the nerve agents GB and GF (and about 70 tonnes of GA) as well as small research quantities of three other nerve agents. Iraq's facilities include the substantial CW production complex Al Muthanna and three CW-related production plants in the vicinity of Al Fallujah. In addition to the central storage of filled chemical munitions, warfare agents and precursor chemicals in bulk at the Al Muthanna facility, filled chemical munitions, often damaged and leaking, were stored at various sites throughout the country. Those which were judged safe to move were transported to Al Muthanna, which has been designated as the central location for CW destruction. Those which could not be moved, a limited number of 122-mm rockets, were destroyed through explosive demolition incineration.

As a result of its chemical inspection programme, UNSCOM now has considerable information on Iraq's chemical agents and munitions. The munitions include various kinds of aerial bombs, mortar bombs, artillery shells and rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and 75 Scud (Al Hussein) missile chemical

warheads, of which 45 were destroyed unilaterally by Iraq, destruction that subsequently was verified by UNSCOM. However, Iraq's continued refusal in its declarations to admit the use during the 1980s of chemical weapons against Iran and internally against the Kurdish population makes it impossible for UNSCOM to establish a material balance of chemical weapons in Iraq and thus to identify fully Iraq's CW programme.

The destruction of mustard gas agent is carried out in an incinerator specially built by Iraq to meet UNSCOM requirements and commissioned in January 1993. Precursor chemicals and missile-related chemicals, which have been moved to Al Muthanna, and various other chemicals found at Al Muthanna will also be incinerated. The nerve agents GB and GB/GF mixtures are being destroyed by controlled hydrolysis in a plant constructed by Iraq to UNSCOM specifications, commissioned in September 1992. After the aqueous waste has partially evaporated, cement will be added. The concrete blocks produced will then be buried on site.

Most 122-mm rockets are assessed as being too dangerous to drill and drain; they are therefore destroyed by a combination of high-temperature incineration and simultaneous explosive opening.

In order to minimize the danger of exposure to CW agents a health and safety regime has been set up by establishing remote agent detector arrays at the hydrolysis plant and at the rocket destruction site. As yet no downwind hazard has been recorded.²⁴

Biological weapons

The inspection activities related to Iraq's BW capability, which initially focused on the major R&D site at Salman Pak, have been dispersed to a number of additional sites. Conclusive evidence that Iraq was engaged in a military BW research programme has been collected. The facility at which this programme was carried out was unilaterally destroyed by the Iraqi authorities. UNSCOM was therefore prevented from obtaining detailed information on the programme. No evidence of an actual weapon programme has been found, but the inspections have provided a sound data base for future monitoring of BW capabilities in Iraq. Undeclared sites known to have been related to BW research have been inspected without any new information having been obtained by the UNSCOM inspectors.

Inspection developments

The Special Commission and the IAEA have developed innovative inspection procedures. The document inspection in September 1991, during which the parking lot incident took place,²⁵ proved very successful by generating a wealth of information on the Iraqi nuclear weapon programme and to a lesser

²⁴ United Nations Security Council document S/24984, 17 Dec. 1992.

²⁵ United Nations Security Council document S/23122, 8 Oct. 1991.

degree on Iraqi missile activities. The translation and analysis of approximately 60 000 pages have not yet been concluded. A number of inspections carried out by UNSCOM and the IAEA to find additional documents were not successful. Apparently as a result of earlier experiences, on occasion Iraq has taken forceful countermeasures, the most serious of which led to the incident at the Ministry of Agriculture. On another occasion in December 1992 Iraqi personnel removed documents from a building in Baghdad during an inspection. An innovation which proved rather successful was the seminar-type discussions held between the inspection team and its Iraqi counterparts in the context of an inspection activity. Important clarifications of Iraq's weapon programmes have frequently been made during these exchanges. The use of helicopters for aerial inspection has given important corroborating information.

In January 1993 the Special Commission introduced continuous inspection by deploying an interim monitoring team in Baghdad. A small group of inspectors, specialized in missile technology, has been given the task of closely following the work at a facility for R&D related to missiles in order to ascertain that no missiles of the type forbidden by the cease-fire resolution are being developed. Early indications are that such an approach can facilitate the work of the Special Commission.

Through the strengthening of the information assessment unit, the Special Commission has considerably increased its ability to make good use of the inspection reports and other information made available to it in the UNSCOM operations.

V. Conclusion

It goes without saying that the complex and sometimes intrusive activities carried out in Iraq by UNSCOM and the IAEA would be unnecessary if Iraq were to change its policy towards the Special Commission and adopt a genuinely co-operative and forthcoming attitude. Iraq has failed to substantiate the information provided about its prohibited programmes—information which has not infrequently proven to be misleading in character. The Special Commission has repeatedly urged Iraq to provide access to authentic documents that would substantiate the data provided by Iraq. Iraqi authorities have claimed that they destroyed all documents related to prohibited activities after the adoption of Resolution 687 and that no records have been kept of the destroyed documents. The Special Commission has difficulty in accepting this claim. On rare occasions Iraq has produced documents to support data it has provided. It is necessary that Iraq meet the long-standing requirement for credible and verifiable data on all of its prohibited programmes.

The Government of Iraq has issued an order that certain types of documents must be protected from inspection by UNSCOM, including by removing them from the sites under inspection. Inspection teams have visited a number of sites which have been sanitized. Within the context of the declarations it has

submitted, the Government of Iraq has stated that it declines to divulge information indicating the names of foreign companies from which it has purchased equipment and materials.²⁶ It is alleged that this decision has been taken on moral grounds. Although the Commission is in possession of some evidence of procurement through elaborate third-party arrangements, the picture of Iraq's supplier network is far from complete. Accurate and full information about Iraq's foreign procurement networks and suppliers is essential if the Special Commission and the IAEA are to establish a complete, coherent and credible picture of Iraq's programmes for weapons of mass destruction as they existed in January 1991 and to decide in a realistic manner whether all of the proscribed items have been accounted for.

The plans for future monitoring and verification of Iraq's non-acquisition of proscribed weapons were approved by the Security Council in Resolution 715. Although the resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and is thus enforceable and obviously binding on all UN members, Iraq has challenged the Security Council by refusing to accept it. The position of the Government of Iraq, as outlined by its Deputy Prime Minister, is that the plans approved by the Security Council are unlawful. Iraq's position is that it may possibly accept the technical elements of the plans, but not the general provisions of the plans and the resolution. The general provisions grant to the Special Commission far-reaching rights as regards authority to carry out on-site inspections of Iraq and aerial surveillance without any limitations as to site or area. The Chairman of the Special Commission declared on repeated occasions in Security Council meetings in March and November 1992 and in meetings with representatives of the Government of Iraq that, provided Iraq demonstrates a forthcoming attitude with regard to monitoring and verification, UNSCOM will exercise its rights under Resolution 715 with due regard to the dignity and national sovereignty of Iraq.²⁷ The Special Commission has expressed concern that it is impossible for it to commence the full monitoring and verification of Iraq's dual capabilities if it is not allowed to exercise its rights under Resolution 715. Iraq can use any pretext for failing to co-operate if it is allowed to maintain that the provisions of Resolution 715 do not apply to it. The non-recognition by Iraq of Resolution 715 is a major obstacle to quick development of the implementation of the cease-fire arrangements, including the plans for monitoring Iraq's weapon capability.

Together with the continuing refusal by Iraq to provide UNSCOM and the IAEA with full information on its foreign procurement, progress in the implementation of the relevant resolutions will be very slow. In spite of the open Iraqi challenge of the Security Council and its resolutions there is no sign of a weakening of the resolve of the Security Council members to demand full and complete implementation of all of the relevant resolutions.

²⁶ See note 24; United Nations Security Council document S/24002, 26 May 1992.

²⁷ See note 24.

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