TURKEY AND ESDP

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Stockholm, 22 September 2004

Contents

Opening remarks

Alyson Bailes, SIPRI

Session I: Turkey’s National Resources and Operational Role

Siret Hursöy, Aegean University, Izmir, Turkey, Introductory Statement

Thanos Dokos, ELIAMEP, Athens, Greece, Introductory Response

Discussion

Session II: The Current and Short-term Agenda for ESDP Development

Murat Bilhan, Centre for Strategic Research, Ankara, Turkey, Introductory Statement

Graham Messervy-Whiting, European Studies Centre, Birmingham, UK, Introductory Response

Discussion

Session III: What Kind of ESDP Do We Want?

Fatih Ceylan, MFA, Ankara, Turkey, Introductory Statement

Giovanni Gasparini, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy, Introductory Response

Discussion

Closing Session

Fatih Ceylan, MFA, Ankara

Alyson Bailes, SIPRI

Appendix I: Conference Programme

Appendix II: Background Paper

Appendix III: Facts and Figures on Turkey’s Operational Contributions to NATO and EU Operations

Introduction

The Seminar on ‘Turkey and ESDP’ was held on 22 September 2004 at SIPRI in cooperation with the Embassy of Turkey to Sweden.

The aim of this event was to provide a forward-looking analysis of the relationship of Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), at a time when the formal procedure to decide whether negotiations about the accession of Turkey to the European Union (EU) should begin was soon to be concluded (with the European Commission’s evaluation due to be published on 6 October). The seminar addressed the capabilities Turkey has offered and might supply in the future for ESDP purposes, including both military and non-military inputs, as well as the implications of the participation of Turkey in ESDP. The analysis extended to the institutional aspects of such participation, and its impact on EU capabilities and operations policy. It covered the importance of ESDP for the future of European construction; the implications of ESDP for different roles of the EU (peacekeeping, peace-making, etc.); as well as the “finalité” of ESDP and the question of a possible future common defence by the EU.

Opening remarks

Alyson Bailes, SIPRI, underlined in her opening remarks that the seminar was rendered timely by three major factors: 1. the European Council would decide soon whether and if so when and how Turkey should start accession talks with the EU; 2. the current situation in Iraq had significant impact on the interests of Turkey and more generally in the greater Middle East. It had affected the relationship of Turkey and the U.S. and influenced the role of Turkey in NATO; and 3. Turkey itself was facing in a very open way the consequences of these issues for its own national identity and transformation.

She pointed out that Turkey was fully involved in NATO’s European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and that when the WEU revived in the early-1990s, Turkey gained a strong status in it as an Associate Member (with rights close to those of full WEU members). In both contexts Turkey displayed many motives common to other European states, but was also especially concerned to protect NATO; its own participation rights; and its own territorial interests. The end of the WEU and the moving of security and defence related matters to the EU was bound to affect negatively those states which were not members of the EU. Security became a matter of 15 member-states who could take decisions simultaneously on using the EU’s military and non-military resources. Turkey inevitably found all three levels of its national concerns re-awakened by this trend of development. The loss of status in ESDP was only temporary for those three European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), which were soon to join the EU: but Turkey’s frustration with its own ambivalent prospects vis-à-vis the latter deepened its concern, and led it to take steps delaying the full implementation of new-style NATO–EU cooperation at the time. The package that was eventually agreed upon in the end of 2002 to resolve this blockage addressed the concerns of Turkey about its own status and role in ESDP and the impact on its national security, but was also facilitated by the more encouraging tone adopted by the European Council in December 2002 regarding Turkey’s own membership.

Turkey’s National Resources and Operational Role

Siret Hursöy, Aegean University, Izmir, Turkey started out from the emergence of new types of threats since 11 September 2001. Terrorism mixes social, economic and political motives with religious ones and religion is often instrumentalized as an ideological cover for other goals. The EU needs the support of Turkey as much as Turkey needs the support of the EU in fighting global terrorism and spreading democratic values. Turkey is in permanent opposition to the mafia and terrorist organisations and stands as a pivot of peace and stability. Given the importance of Turkey in the region, any instability in Turkey could easily undermine stability in the greater Middle East and Europe at large.

Dr. Hursöy analysed the potential contribution of Turkey to ESDP, militarily and non-militarily, from three angles: 1. European identity, 2. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and 3. Regional stability.

As far as European identity is concerned: Turkey is a frontline democratic and secular country whose inclusion into the EU would be a litmus test for the secular identity of the EU. Turkey has been criticised by its partners in Europe for providing a springboard for terrorism and the trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings. In fact it is playing a key role in combating these illegal activities. The EU should not marginalise or distort Turkey’s place in Europe just because of the sensitivity of the membership question.

The Washington NATO summit of April 1999 made strong reference to non-EU NATO members’ status in a situation where the Atlantic Alliance might permit the EU to use NATO’s planning and operational capabilities for ESDP operations. The EU did not accept the Washington formula and, as Turkey saw it, offered a weak consultation mechanism to non-EU NATO members. That was why Turkey blocked decisions in NATO concerning generic and specific arrangements for the transfer of NATO’s operational capabilities for possible EU ESDP operations. The subsequent negotiations brought into being the so-called Ankara Document of December 2001, according to which Turkey could automatically participate in EU-led military operations in the event that NATO assets and capabilities were used, but in a situation where NATO assets and capabilities were not used Turkey could only participate if the EU Council invited it. Despite these difficult beginnings, Turkey had been among the first supporting nations of the EU’s Headline Goal for military capabilities and had offered a brigade with necessary air and sea support.

As for as Turkey’s contributions to CFSP: the assumption must be that any conflict would first be tackled with non-military measures and the use of military force would come as a last resort. “…ESDP is organised as a policy of ‘soft’ military missions backed up by robust economic and diplomatic tools of the EU” – and it was precisely this that gave the EU a potential advantage over NATO in areas like crisis prevention and management. Turkey was close to the approach of the EU in this regard, seeing conflict management as a full-spectrum task that required a graduated response. However, as Siret Hursöy put it, Turkey “is ready to provide its unconditional support only if it becomes a full member of the EU”. Turkey has the experience and capabilities to contribute to security and stability in a wide geographic framework that would make the ESDP stronger. It has been present in operations in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia. It has been engaged in several multilateral arrangements, like the Multinational Peace Force of South Eastern Europe, the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Initiative and the Organisation of Economic Co-operation (a platform that brings together Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and the Central Asian republics). Turkey has taken the lead in certain multilateral arrangements, such as a multinational task force in the Black Sea context (BLACKSEAFOR) and the Stability Pact for the South Caucasus. A country like Turkey, carrying a mixture of characteristics from East and West, could make the ESDP a real and potent multi-cultural force contributing to stability, dialogue and cooperation.

The contribution of Turkey to the resolution of conflicts in its conflict-prone and conflict-ridden neighbourhood was also indispensable. The Caucasus imbroglio, including Chechnya and the Azeri-Armenian conflict, could not be resolved without the involvement of Turkey. The same applied to stability in the Balkans, in Greek-Turkish relations and solving the Cyprus problem. The problems in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the need for regime transformation in Syria, Iraq and Iran, required the contribution of Turkey as well. Turkey had demonstrated its will and ability for action in the region by undertaking the command of ISAF in Afghanistan. In sum, Turkey was a pivotal country regionally and played a stabiliser role “from the Balkans up to China, as well as from Morocco up to Iran”. The European Security Strategy had revealed that the EU was eager to play a role in the region outside of Europe, and Turkey could effectively contribute to this both within its region and elsewhere.

The Turkish armed forces had a lot to offer for ESDP. They were well-trained, professional and efficient, and constantly modernising themselves. They possessed important strategic capabilities, and above all, Turkey’s military presence in the region provided a strong element of deterrence. Their structures were constantly being transformed according to the nature of new threats, which required flexible and mobile troops, hi-tech weapons and intelligence. The size of the Turkish armed forces and the percentage of Turkey’s defence expenditures were much higher than in the majority of EU member states. Turkish special forces had participated in peace and security efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan and Somalia.

Thanos Dokos, ELIAMEP, Athens, Greece started out from the fundamental change in the region. Whereas in the 1990s Turkey’s military strength was exclusively assessed as a threat by Greek analysts and Greece took the lead in keeping Turkey out of the EU, now the situation was just the reverse.

Turkey was certainly able to contribute to power projection. Its special forces had combat experience, which the forces of many other EU member states lacked. It must be borne in mind, however that the Turkish territorial defence forces contained a very large conscript cohort whose training was of somewhat more doubtful quality.

Turkey could be an important participant in the settlement of the Azeri-Armenian conflict and might form part of an eventual resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Turkey could also contribute helpfully in sub-Saharan Africa. Turkey might also be specially suited to contribute to conflict management in certain cases. In some others, however its participation could raise certain sensitivities as “a heir to the Ottoman empire”.

Dr. Dokos raised the issue of whether Turkey could use its military capabilities as a bargaining chip in the accession process. Given the prospect of protracted accession talks, the question could also be raised of how the defence factor would come into play if a crisis occurred during the period of negotiations. (E.g., might Turkey withdraw the generous offers it had made to ESDP hitherto?)

As for the assets of Turkey: there were certain shortcomings with its combat helicopters, which were not state-of-the-art. Turkish space capabilities did not add to the level of space cooperation that had been achieved in the EU framework. On the other hand, it was welcome that Turkey was developing its “gendarmerie” as this might open the possibility for it to contribute to those European operations requiring such paramilitary forces.

In the industrial sphere, Turkey was very closely connected with U.S. arms production firms. This raised some question concerning the non-NATO (non-U.S.) interoperability of the Turkish armed forces.

Discussion

[This and subsequent ‘discussion’ segments record the main questions and responses arising in discussion between the speakers and other participants, without attributing the points made to individuals.]

What would be the impact of an eventual negative reply from the EU in December 2004 to Turkey’s accession? In that case, it was suggested that Turkey would have to focus more on its national interest. There was a danger that some separatist groups might become more active against the state. The EU had the chance to pull Turkey in a certain direction and it should not miss this opportunity.

The relations of Turkey with ESDP had developed around certain focal points. The first was when Turkey offered a brigade-size contribution of 5500 troops with maritime and air component at the first Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000. That offer was still on the table. December 2002 represented another turning point, when the “Berlin plus” arrangement for NATO-EU sharing of capabilities was approved by NATO. The Council meeting of December 2004 would be the third turning point when the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey was to be decided.

The question was raised whether, given that Turkey might face a long accession process unprecedented in the history of the EU, there might be proposals to bring Turkey fully into some EU activities (such as ESDP) before its full accession. (Although there was no answer to this proposition during the discussion, it is relevant that a somewhat similar idea of offering partial membership in the second and third pillar to the Central European candidate countries was declined by the latter as a delaying tactic in the mid-1990s. - P.D.) The idea was advocated that Turkey join as many multinational formations as possible during the process of its approach, and then accession, to the EU. ESDP might develop to its full capacity between 2010 and 2015 at about the time when Turkey was most likely to become a member of the EU. Hence, one had to consider parallel and continuously moving developments and processes when speaking about aligning Turkey with the ESDP.

As for Turkish capabilities, it was emphasised that the special forces of Turkey were fully professional, while EU member-states had interoperability problems with these types of forces themselves. Complementarity should be the aim among armed forces which would participate in multinational operations.

There were signs of centralisation and concentration in the defence industry of Turkey at national level. How should these signs be interpreted? It was Turkey’s main goal at present to develop technologically and become self-sufficient. At the same time, Turkey intended to participate in many European projects, including the A-400M project. It was also noted that the procurement of European defence systems was not a condition of EU accession.

How was Turkey associated with the obverse of ESDP’s active and interventionist side, i.e. non-proliferation efforts? Turkey was part of every disarmament and armaments policy of NATO and it fully supported the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which – bearing in mind its geographic location and its long sea boundaries – meant very active participation. It had systematically aimed to associate itself with progressive positions on arms control and disarmament adopted by the EU.

The situation on the island of Cyprus was raised, and it was stressed that Turkey had supported the Annan plan which was still on the table. It was a pity that the population of the Republic of Cyprus did not approve the plan. The EU had made promises in return for the population of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus approving the plan (like direct flights from Europe to the north of Cyprus, etc.) but had fallen down on implementing them.

The Current and Short-term Agenda for ESDP Development

Murat Bilhan, Centre for Strategic Research, Ankara, Turkey raised the question whether the Greater Middle East concept and the Wider Europe concept could be seen as converging or diverging. According to Amb. Bilhan, there were now five major powers of the world: The U.S., Russia, China, India and the EU. Among them the EU was the most split and controversial.

Turkey used to be on the southern flank of NATO, which had been gradually losing its importance in the cold war period. Now this area was regaining its significance as a “transit route of the evil and the good”. Turkey was the safest, shortest energy transit route from the producers to the customers. More than 80 per cent of the energy resources of the world were concentrated in areas close to Turkey. Seen as it should be under this broader perspective, Turkey had for long been a security producing and not a security consuming country.

Turkey lay in a region that most major powers of the world complained about. The aim of the U.S. was to transform the countries of the Greater Middle East into democracies ranging from Pakistan to North Africa, including Afghanistan and the South Caucasus. Russia and China had problems with the threats spreading from this region in their direction. India complained about the spill over of insecurity from Kashmir. The EU had also been anxious and had taken the view that internal dynamics should be activated (civil society, etc.) as part of a solution.

The Greater Middle East held approximately 1.2 billion people, a minority in the world as a whole. It was still resisting changes which Russia, India and China had already accepted, but it could not resist forever. The dilemma was that it was difficult to find dynamics for change when such changes were directly against the interests of local elites, and the force for bottom-up change was absent. Turkey was a moderate, secular, democratic country, but the problem was that it was not accepted as a model. It remained sui generis and there was a danger that this situation would also prevail in the future. Nevertheless, Turkey was ready to get involved together with others to address even the toughest problems, like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Turkey was well placed to get involved together with Europe in the resolution of that conflict as it was ‘equidistant’ between the Palestinians and the Israelis; had no tradition of anti-Semitism, and had its own Jewish community. Turkey could offer not only defence assets but also considerable assets/openings for promoting peace, including in its own neighbourhood.

Graham Messervy-Whiting, European Studies Centre, University of Birmingham, UK identified three aspects of the near-term development of ESDP to be analysed: Operations, Capabilities and Institutions.

The key challenges in operations was to develop the necessary rapid reaction capabilities, including battle groups; the streamlining of operational decision-making; the definition of relations with the UN, and cooperation with NATO. These developments would fit with Turkey’s own efforts for military transformation and its developing rapid reaction capability.

The current or near-term operations of the EU included a new ‘rule of law’ mission in Georgia, and the possible despatch of a small team of military experts to help the African Union plan the operation in Darfur. It would be good if Turkey could consider its involvement in a EU action in sub-Saharan Africa. The planning of Operation Altea in Bosnia and Herzegovina was making good progress: the force generation conference had already taken place and the contributors’ committee was being set up. As soon as Turkish forces were accepted by the commander of the operation Turkey would have full rights as contributor.

Article 140 of the EU Constitutional Treaty had widened the possible scope of EU missions, i.a. to include disarmament-linked, military assistance and terrorist related missions. Turkey was well placed to contribute to these types of actions as well.

The development of a EU/NATO capabilities group was very important to keep coherence. Turkey contributed in an important manner to this process. The informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers a few days ago had confirmed the Headline Goal 2010 as a new target; prepared for new capabilities commitment conference in November 2004; welcomed the defence planning work carried in the EU Military Staff, and the results of the work done by EU Institute for Security Studies towards an EU defence white paper. It had confirmed plans for a gendarmerie force that would also be relevant for Turkey.

The new Defence Agency arrangements did acknowledge the special role of Turkey and Norway. The ‘Berlin plus’ procedures had been fully activated for Operation Altea, which involved i.a. the attachment of Norwegian and Turkish officers to the EU planning team. Article 140 of the EU Constitutional Treaty defined the role and the importance of the non-EU partners in ESDP.

Overall, the concordance of the membership of the EU and NATO had grown and was still growing. 26 states were now members or acknowledged applicants of both organisations. Norway, Iceland and EU non-allies had clear partnership frameworks with the institutions they did not belong to. It was only Cyprus and Malta, which were not really present in the overlapping defence ‘hard core’.

Discussion

How did Turkey perceive the EU/NATO relationship, e.g. with respect to possible duplication or competition between the NATO Response Force (NRF) and EU battle groups? Turkey had been actively supporting the NRF concept in preparation for the Prague NATO summit and had offered to lead the land-based component of NRF from 2003 until the end of 2004, when it was going to hand it over to Italy. Turkey hosted the first NRF exercise in 2003. On a closer look at the two concepts, it should be clear that the underlying principles/aims of NRF and battle groups were the same (similar readiness, robustness, and sustainability). So, Turkey had always advocated ‘complementarity’ between these forces and drawing them from a single pool. Turkey preferred not to take a theoretical view on ‘primacy’ between the forces. Turkey would expect to use EU battle groups in the ‘lighter’ part of the spectrum, while the NRF was suitable for tasks at the higher end, e.g. some elements were now deployed in Afghanistan. That was why Turkey was not particularly concerned about the deployment of forces under the battle group concept five thousand km-s away from Brussels. Others were of the view that there was no need to think in competitive terms between the two: the forces would actually overlap, i.a. due to double-hatting at the national level.

The question was raised whether Turkey would want the EU to become a strategic actor, like Russia or China? Turkey did not see the EU as a monolithic bloc and did not assume that it would or should become one. This was an inherent weakness of the EU vis-à-vis other great powers and implied less of a long-term strategic vision. If the EU did have a strategic vision it would see more clearly the value of including Turkey as a strong state in its own right, and also as a regional power with influence ranging from the Balkans potentially to as far away as China. Turkey had deeper links with the EU than the Balkan countries had. The EU should think more constructively about using it.

What could the UK and Turkey do together or for each other to ease the U.S./European problem? The position of the UK was admitted to be sensitively balanced, as it had far more long-standing ties to Europe than to the U.S. A part of the problem arose from domestic public opinion in the post-Iraq situation. Turkey for its part would not join the EU as a U.S. puppet. It would tilt the balance towards the EU being a proper, independent strategic bloc, between the U.S. and European allegiances, which would open the prospect of tensions being resolved in a new way. In support of this perspective it was also noted that the UK already regarded the EU as a trade bloc “against” the United States. The UK had also always been in favour of Turkish entry.

The relationship of ESDP and Russia was discussed. Russia had been fascinated by ESDP for a number of reasons, the potential weakening of the U.S. presence and of NATO among them. Moscow also hoped to draw benefits for its defence industry from involvement in ESDP. At the same time, Russia had become very close to NATO and the view is widespread that Russia was in fact a NATO member without voting rights. Turkish interests generally converged with those of Russia but the two countries sometimes differed over the remedies to be applied. In some places Russia could be seen as a rival to Turkey, like in Central Asia where Europe in general was not yet really a player. A positive, but cautious approach was advocated vis-à-vis Russia: the forthcoming EU-Russia summit of November 2004 should agree upon a roadmap of cooperation, also in the military field. Initial exchanges about cooperation had focussed upon strategic assets, like making use of Russian military transport and cooperating in satellite imagery. The agenda had broadened and had now included cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were also some exploratory talks on providing for information security. This pragmatic cooperation should be able to continue so long as Russia did not diverge from the line it had pursued in recent years.

Where would Turkish opinion think it suitable for Turkey to contribute to international operations? It was clear that the public opinion would be supportive where national interests were involved. If consulted, the Turkish public would not so easily say ‘Yes’ if, for instance, asked to go to the Congo (as in the EU’s Operation Artemis). A UN mandate would, however, make a big difference for the Turkish public (NB that Turkey had been active and even held a command role in Somalia), as it would be seen as providing a perfect legitimacy to an operation. Turkey had been punctilious in offering its capabilities and using them for NATO. When a member of the EU, it would offer them just as fully for EU purposes. The sending of Turkish troops abroad would, however, continue to need approval by the National Assembly, except for the fulfilment of UN and NATO commitments.

What were the implications of Turkey’s large armed forces and the separate elite forces for the democratic control? It should be noted that in modern Turkey the army had remained in the barracks most of the time. Between 1960 and 1980 it interfered with politics only twice. The Turkish army was not basically different from other European armies, in Turkey’s own view: the difference was in the proportions. It was clear why the Turkish army was needed and why it had to be of this size. The State Accounting Court controlled the armed forces and reported to the National Assembly. The Turkish Security Council that had aroused EU criticism in the past was pre-dominantly a civilian body and, under new legislation, an advisory body. Criticism from the EU that the army was not linked to the MoD but to the Prime Minister should be seen in light of the fact that the army was the most trusted institution of Turkish society. Europe should understand this and see the pitfalls of a change that would downgrade the Turkish army to a size and role more similar to the armed forces of other EU countries. On the other hand, the question of Turkish forces’ role in maintaining national integrity also in face of certain internal ethnic constituencies was acknowledged by all as a difficult and delicate one, both for Turkey’s own development and in the Turkey-EU context.

What Kind of ESDP Do We Want?

Fatih Ceylan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, Turkey asked whether the question implied that we were not content with the ESDP as it stood. ESDP constituted an indispensable dimension of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and of the EU, which was increasingly evolving into a multi-dimensional security structure. The recently agreed-upon Constitutional Treaty contained concrete signs in this direction. The security dimension of the EU needed to be in harmony and more important, in synergy with its national and institutional partners in order to be truly functional and effective. The U.S. seemed almost too ready to employ a fixed menu of “hard power” alone, with little or no planning for the post conflict phase, while the EU had emerged as a strong advocate of “soft power” with limited capabilities for decisive military action. The way ahead should be “post-modern security”, which relied on integration processes and transnational cooperation, and demanded a multi-dimensional approach to security.

Many documents (the European Security Strategy, the new neighbourhood policy and the Constitutional Treaty) showed how the EU was institutionally moving into the defence realm. They recognized that “Europe is at peace but the world is not”. Given the vulnerability of our societies in an era of globalisation, territorial defence alone was increasingly insufficient to deal with the full spectrum of threats and risks. The conclusion must be drawn that homeland defence actually began abroad. The test for the EU was whether it could perform adequately in time of a crisis, not whether it could provide for its own security in the narrow sense of the word where it was not challenged by anyone.

If the EU was to acquire a strategic dimension it should, as a whole, strive more to coordinate and optimise its efforts in the defence realm. The overriding aim should be to create agile, deployable, usable and (particularly) interoperable forces. The evolution of ESDP was likely to culminate some time in the future in a common defence. In this evolutionary process the EU should:

• Go on working together with NATO. This was properly a dimension of the emerging strategic identity of the EU.

• Develop and implement a common vision towards addressing and tackling contemporary security challenges.

• Ensure complementarity in developing its own capabilities, both as among EU members and between Euro-Atlantic security structures.

• Ensure inclusiveness in working with non-EU member European Allies. Involving non-EU member European Allies in the European security structures could only help enhance their unity of purpose.

It was false to assume that Turkey had a strategic culture profoundly different from that of Europe. Its historical realities were somewhat special, dating back to two historical eras. One of them was the pre-Republican era when Turkey made futile attempts to preserve its empire. The other was the Turkish experience in two world wars. More recently, in the post-cold war era, Turkey’s proximity to conflict ridden areas was seen as having endowed Turkey with a propensity to resort to hard power more easily than its European allies. Such comments notwithstanding, Turkey was a bastion of stability in its region that strove to spread stability further through multilateral and bilateral efforts. As a forward looking, secular, democratic and dynamic member of the European family Turkey could provide an indispensable added value to enhancing Euro-Atlantic security.

The debate over Iraq, in Turkey’s view, did not mark the end of the transatlantic link. Iraq had put serious strain on transatlantic relations and exacerbated already existing perceptions in Europe about the unilateral tendencies of the U.S. On the other hand, the damage done underlined the need for maintaining that very link. Turkey had concluded from the Iraq case that the transatlantic link and ESDP were compatible and not mutually exclusive.

Turkey was of the view that its EU membership would add a strategic depth to ESDP. There were several reasons for this:

• The geo-strategic position of Turkey, located at the junction of three continents and bordering the most volatile and also resource rich regions of the world.

• Turkey was a transit route of transportation, communication and trade with the Caucasus, Asia and the Middle East. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, as well as the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) to carry Azerbaijani natural gas to Turkey and then to Europe from 2006 were projects that increased Turkey’s strategic importance.

• Turkey could ease the dialogue between East and West, with particular impact in the Middle East.

• Turkey’s EU accession would radiate the Union’s power and influence towards the Greater Middle East and North Africa.

Turkey had been making great efforts to develop a common vision between NATO and the EU/ESDP as well as broadening the strategic relations between these organisations. The overriding goal should be to achieve closer cooperation, inclusiveness and transparency throughout and within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The basic unity of purpose between NATO and the EU was a given.

Fatih Ceylan concluded with three appeals:

• To unilateralists: In today’s security environment no single power had the capability to cope with contemporary challenges. Indivisibility of security was more valid than ever before. Therefore, transatlantic relations should be improved.

• To the NATO Allies: NATO-EU strategic relations should be deepened through building a common vision. This would not only facilitate the further strengthening of the ESDP in a more fundamental fashion into common defence, but also increase the effectiveness of efforts towards generating peace and stability.

• To the Euro-centrists: Involvement of the non-EU member European Allies in EU defence efforts was an added value. In order to have a sound, functioning and effective ESDP, non-EU member European allies should be encouraged to partake in ESDP structures and activities. This was in line with the motto “unity in diversity”. Existing arrangements provided a sound basis to that end.

Giovanni Gasparini, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy proposed to adopt a 10-15 years’ perspective. How would transatlantic relations be functioning by that time? NATO would grow weaker as an institution as there was not much U.S. interest in it and other allies were not doing enough to maintain its importance. The need would, however, remain to bring the U.S. in and build European military strength. ESDI should be buried for this purpose: ESDP could be more effective to provide European capabilities. It could be expected that some decisions on ESDP would eventually be taken by majority. The only way to move ESDP forward was an integrated approach in order to stop wasting resources. The EU accounted for more than 20 per cent of the defence spending of the whole world. For the 160-180 bn Euro it spent, it could buy far more military capabilities than it had at present.

Europe was not ready for Turkey now. Turkey’s accession talks might last a decade. During this period of time Turkey would continue to change, and so would the EU. Accession and the process leading to it would also change the perception of Turkey in Europe. Turkey was often seen as a point of cleavage: a border zone of Europe, bridging over civilizations. Turkey’s perception was different on countries, like Iraq, Israel, Syria and Russia. This might lead to political differences between Turkey and several European countries. Another problem was that the Turkish gendarmerie had been trained very differently than other European countries. Currently, it would be extremely difficult to integrate. Overall, the contribution of Turkey would depend partly upon its capabilities but also on its political credibility.

The process leading to the Constitutional Treaty had demonstrated that there was a problem with EU decision-making. If the decision of the Council in December 2004 was in favour of starting accession talks with Turkey, there would remain plenty of time to adapt some ESDP structures. It would be a good idea to offer associate membership to Turkey in the European Defence Agency.

Discussion

Was Europe doing enough to improve military capabilities and could Europe, in this light, take over the territorial defence of Europe from NATO? It was clear that Europe was not doing enough to improve military capabilities. To maintain the relevance of the trans-Atlantic link, it would be the preference of Turkey to keep collective defence in NATO. For different reasons, Sweden would take the same view. Some commenters felt it was simply “a bridge too far” for the EU to take over the defence of Europe. (Not to mention the uncertainty about the interpretation of “Europe” in this context.) It should be borne in mind that a number of non-NATO EU member-states already had problems in digesting the development of ESDP and EU anti-terrorism cooperation, not to mention the problem they would have if this deepened further. Bearing in mind, however that there was no traditional threat directed against Europe, it could also be argued that it did not matter too much who took care of the non-existent problem.

The declining U.S. interest in Europe was not necessarily seen as a problem. It was a problem, however, that the U.S. now seemed interested in NATO only if it was global. Was it in the Europeans’ interest to support NATO if the U.S. bypassed it to carry out ‘coalition’ actions and then come back asking for the support of Europe when things didn’t work out? Furthermore, the U.S. was moving away from NATO standardization. Others were of the view, however, that NATO should not be underestimated as innovative work was going on over there. NATO would remain an important bureaucratic instrument, an important place for meetings and discussions, and important strategically for the U.S.

According to some participants, ESDP was the next big EU integration project (EMU and the introduction of the Euro was the previous one). There was a lot to develop within this project, ranging from the battle group concept through the European Defence Agency and the solidarity clause enshrined in the Constitutional Treaty. The best demonstration of the prospect for ESDP was that US–EU relations were already moving well beyond economic cooperation, to cover a broad range of security matters. It was an interesting demonstration of this that the Department of Homeland Security had just sent a representative to Brussels, and he was assigned to the EU (not NATO).

Closing Session

Alyson Bailes, SIPRI felt that much of the discussion had been underlaid by the difference between a defence community (like NATO) and a community of integration (like the EU). The direction of history and the nature of current security threats suggested that the two would need increasingly to overlap. Those in a defence community should integrate more deeply while those in a community of integration should join the community of defence. While this underlined the fast-growing relevance of ESDP, it might also soon present a problem for institutions that represented neither a community of integration, nor of defence – e.g. the OSCE. She also raised the question whether there was a global trend of integration in security matters inter alia. Did institutions like ASEAN, Mercosur and the African Union represent the same trend and could they emulate the development of the Euro-Atlantic area? Finally she predicted that ESDP and Turkey would interact irrespective of whether accession talks proceeded or not.

Fatih Ceylan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, Turkey hoped that the EU would take a positive decision on opening accession talks with Turkey. Turkey had a lot to contribute to the ESDP both in its own region and more globally. No far-fetched conclusion should be drawn from the fact that Turkey, after some serious debate, was unable to participate in the EU’s Operation Artemis in the Congo. Turkey was committed to contribute to the NATO response force whenever it was needed. Turkey would have the same position on the EU’s battle groups in future too.

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